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Abstract  
This study was driven by interest in climate change problems and scenarios created to help reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions. The report investigates a scenario-study made by the European Commis-
sion Joint Research Centre called ‘Global Climate Policy Scenarios for 2030 and beyond’. The pur-
pose of this study was to explore the underlying assumptions and approach of the JRC report and 
see how these influence the reliability of the three model-based scenarios the JRC have created to 
contribute to scientific research on limiting climate change to two degrees Celsius. This paper was 
approached through critical realism which enabled to move from the JRC report to its most impor-
tant aspects which were considered to be `Resources´ and `Carbon value´. It was concluded that the 
JRC report has rather optimistic view-points when it comes to resources relying on technology to 
solve any resource constraint problems which directly oppose the pessimistic view-points stating 
that geophysical constraints cannot be overlooked. The JRC report emphasises carbon pricing in the 
industrial sectors but leaves out others like transportation which could benefit the reduction sce-
nario. Furthermore, the Clean Development Mechanism is to be responsible for a quarter of the total 
reductions in the greenhouse gas reduction scenario but might have serious long-term implications 
that might prohibit the outcome of the scenario.  
 
  
  
Preface  
The foundation for this project is rooted in our interest in the environment - how it is treated and 
how different challenges such as global warming affect the World. The environment is a broad term 
encompassing many different fields. Due to increased focus on the climate we found it essential to 
look into climate change. Climate change is caused by an increase of greenhouse gasses in the at-
mosphere, which is generally assumed to come from human activities. Different scenarios have 
been made to illustrate what impact climate change could have on the world. Some of these scenar-
ios contribute to the political agenda and influence environmental policies and these contributed to 
our choice of focus.   
We have chosen to approach the issue of climate change through an investigation of one scenario 
study which is the following: ‘Global Climate Policy Scenarios for 2030 and beyond’ made by the 
Joint Research Centre (JRC) under the EU. The JRC study was made to support the worldwide goal 
of limiting the global temperature increase to two degrees Celsius by 2100. The JRC scenario-study 
was selected due to different reasons. Firstly, since the JRC study was made in cooperation with the 
EU we saw it as a study with great influence and a scenario that may very well contribute to the 
awareness of climate change and the need for environmental policies within the EU. Secondly, the 
data used to make the scenarios in the JRC study, were accessible, which was essential for our 
analysis. In our search for scenarios we experienced that in most studies the accessibility of data 
was limited or even hidden.   
 
In our project we have evaluated the reliability of the method used to create the scenarios in the JRC 
report. We have investigated this from a critical realism approach. In order to evaluate the method-
ology of a scenario, it is important to know the underlying dimensions, which critical realism calls: 
the empirical, actual and real domain. Thus this approach gave us the possibility to make a thorough 
review of the way that the JRC has put together their scenarios.  
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Glossary  
BBO: Billion Barrels of Oil 
Business-as-usual scenario: The scenario for future world patterns of energy consumption and 
greenhouse gas emissions which assumes that there will not be any major changes in priorities and 
attitudes. 
Cap-and-trade: A method for pollution emissions (emitted to the atmosphere) regulation and re-
duction. 
CCS: Carbon Capture and Storage: Technology to capture and store CO2 in geological structures 
CDM: Clean Development Mechanism: established by Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol. Its aim is 
to implement emissions reduction project in developing countries. The project developer receives 
CER allocations for each spared tone of GHG. 
CER: Certificated Emission Reduction: Offset generated by tone of GHG reduction through 
CDM-related project. 
EU ETS: European Union Emissions Trading Scheme: The largest multi-region and multi-sector 
scheme covering CO2 emissions from industry and the power sector. 
GEM-E3: General Equilibrium Model for economy, energy and environment: A multi-region 
and multi-sector model. Its aim is to analyse the interaction between energy systems, economy and 
environment. 
GHG: Greenhouse Gas: The overall term for different gases in the atmosphere that absorb and 
emit radiation. Usually referring to one of the six gases covered by the Kyoto Protocol – CO2 
(carbon dioxide), CH4 (methane), N20 (nitrous oxide), HFCs (hydrofluorocarbons), PFCs 
(perfluorocarbons), SF6 (sulphur hexafluoride). 
IET: International Emissions Trading: Established by Article 17 of the Kyoto protocol allowing 
developed countries to trade with specific amount of emissions credits. 
JI: Joint Implementation: Established by the Article 6 of the Kyoto Protocol, promotes emissions 
reduction projects in developed countries financed by another developed country. Through JI-
related projects the project developer receives offsets created by one ton of GHG emissions reduc-
tion. 
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JRC: Joint Research Centre: Its aim is to provide technical and scientific support for the EU 
strategies/policies. 
Kyoto Protocol: The most important climate agreement negotiated in the United Nations Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change in 1997. It became forceful on 16 February 2005 and covered 
period from 2008 to 2012. Its objective is to reduce GHG emissions globally 
POLES: Prospective Outlook on Long-term Energy Systems: A world energy demand and sup-
ply model created by European Commission research centre. It is used to estimate the efficiency of 
energy and GHG emissions abatement policies through projection of carbon dioxide emissions and 
carbon value. 
NGL: Natural Gas Liquids 
OPEC: Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries 
PDD: Project Design Document: The main document needed in order to validate and register a 
CDM project activity. 
SEC: Securities and Exchange Commission 
SCC: Social Cost of Carbon: Used for estimation of the benefit for society expressed in monetary 
value, from avoiding the damage caused by each additional ton of CO2 emitted to the atmosphere.  
tCO2-eq: Stands for tons of CO2 equivalent, where all GHG emissions are translated into CO2 
emissions amount with an equivalent greenhouse effect. 
URR: Ultimately Recoverable Resources 
USGS: United States Geological Survey 
Group 16  SIB 21.2 Spring 2012 
 
Page 6 of 73 
 
1 Introduction 
Climate change appears to be one of the biggest threats to humanity. It is defined as a natural proc-
ess of interaction between solar radiation, the atmosphere, ocean and land. There is evidence of his-
torical climate shifts on our planet (NOAA National Weather Service – Climate Change, 2007, 1). 
Over the past decades a significant climate change has been observed. The IPCC (Intergovernmen-
tal Panel on Climate Change) argues, “that most of the observed increase in the globally averaged 
temperature since the mid-20th century is very likely due to the observed increase in anthropogenic 
greenhouse gas concentrations” (NOAA National Weather Service – Climate Change, 2007, 2). 
Generally, humankind is blamed for the climate change we experience today, because of certain 
actions that made this process become rapid and harmful. By actions, it is meant that people con-
tribute to the change in global temperature by burning fossil fuels - like coal, oil and natural gas, 
which produce big amounts of greenhouse gases (GHG), which are emitted to the atmosphere. Out 
of these GHG CO2 (carbon dioxide) emissions are the most significant and have increased rapidly 
since 1750, as a result of growth in the consumption of fossil fuels (IPCC – Synthesis Report, 2007, 
31, 38).  Any changes in the level of GHG content, energy balance or solar radiation have a huge 
impact on the atmosphere (Bernstein et al., 2007, 37).  
GHG can absorb and emit radiation; they accumulate in the atmosphere and remain there for centu-
ries (Stern, 2007, xiii).  Such a condition holds the heat within the atmosphere and leads to an in-
crease in global temperature (NOAA National Weather Service – Climate Change, 2007, 2). An 
increase in temperature also supports the idea that there is a correlation between an increase in GHG 
emissions and the climate (IPCC – Synthesis Report, 2007, 31). 
There are several signs of rising temperatures; the most remarkable one is the retreating glaciers 
which have resulted in an increase in sea-level by 10-20cm (Meadows et al., 2004, 3). 
It is expected that climate change might have very serious consequences if not mitigated.  The big-
gest impact of climate change is extreme weather anomalies that have been much more frequent 
since 1950, such as hurricanes, flooding, heat waves, water and food shortages followed by deterio-
rating health of the population of Earth (Climate Change – Health and Environmental Effects, Ex-
treme Events). Another impact of climate change is loss of biodiversity (CBD, 2007, 4). 
 “Climate change is a global issue that requires a global response” (Stern, 2007, xiii). Humanity 
produces wastes, like emissions, faster than they can be utilised. It is therefore necessary to intro-
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duce the most efficient emission reduction policies in the upcoming years. Lowering the impact of 
climate change is a global challenge. A challenge, which if failed might irreversibly harm ecosys-
tems, economies and the world population. It should therefore be in everyone’s interests to adapt 
policies and take international action to overcome the issue of climate change. This report is an at-
tempt to investigate the underlying assumptions and estimations in regards to suggested projections 
for GHG emissions reduction. 
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2 Problem Area 
“The scientific evidence is now overwhelming: climate change is a serious global 
threat, and it demands an urgent global response” (Stern, 2006, vi) 
Climate Change is one of the major challenges in the 21
st
 century. In the 1990s people realised the 
need for an international agreement to overcome the issue of Climate Change. The Kyoto Protocol 
is an international agreement made in connection with the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change. The Protocol was approved in Kyoto, Japan, the 11
th
 of December 1997 and 
came into force the 16
th
 of February 2005. It will expire at the end of 2012 but with future editions 
still to come (United Nations - Kyoto Protocol, 2012). 
The aim of the Kyoto Protocol is to halt the increase in the average global temperature, which 
means to stabilise the GHG concentrations in the atmosphere that is achieved by a reduction of 
GHG emissions. The aim of the protocol is to be met by establishing a set of binding obligations for 
37 industrialised countries and the European Community. Due to the industrial expansion in devel-
oped countries during the last 150 years, these countries are recognised as responsible for the high 
concentration of GHG that the world experiences today and this group therefore has a greater bur-
den attached. This is in accordance with the principle: ‘Common but differentiated responsibility’ 
(United Nations - Kyoto Protocol, 2012). The industrialised countries and the European Union 
should during the time period 2008-2012 reduce their GHG emissions by five per cent to the 1990 
level and by the year 2020 at least a 15-30 per cent reduction should be achieved (Russ et al., 2007, 
9). The overall aim of the protocol is to limit the global temperature increase to two degrees Celsius 
(to the 1990 level) by 2100. This limit is considered as the maximum in preventing precarious an-
thropogenic interference with the climate system (Russ et al., 2007, 7, 15). 
The realisation, of the aim of limiting the global temperature increase to two degrees Celsius by 
2100, is common and discussed throughout the World (The World Bank – Climate Change, 2012). 
The EU supports the Kyoto agreement and has also paid great attention to the issue in the European 
Commission’s work of January 2007: Limiting Global Climate Change to 2 Degrees Celsius - the 
way ahead for 2020 and beyond (Russ et al., 2007, 7). In order to discuss the future possibility of 
climate change, to be able to make more efficient environmental policies, scenarios have been cre-
ated (Murphy, 1999).  
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As a contribution to the European Commission’s work in 2007, the Joint Research Centre (JRC) for 
Prospective Technological Studies has made a report concentrating on future scenarios: ‘Global 
Climate Policy Scenarios for 2030 and beyond’ (JRC report). The JRC report presents scenarios in 
regards to GHG emission reductions for the year 2050.  
Three scenarios were developed: the ‘baseline scenario’ characterised with a business-as-usual ap-
proach and a more energy efficient one; the ‘GHG reduction scenario’ (Russ et al., 2007, 10). Fur-
thermore a ‘reference scenario’ is included in the JRC report, which is based on the baseline sce-
nario, but with significant improvements in energy efficiency and policy making (Russ et al., 2007, 
28). 
There exist many different analytical tools used to construct scenarios. The methodological ap-
proach used in the JRC report consists of the POLES model (Prospective Outlook for the Long term 
Energy System) and the GEM-E3 model (General Equilibrium Model for Economy, Energy and 
Environment). POLES is a sectoral simulation model focusing on energy and is the primary model 
used for creating the scenarios in the report (Russ et al., 2007, 17). The other model, GEM-E3, ex-
plains the impact reductions of GHG emissions will have on all sectors of the economy. This means 
that the model describes the interaction between economy, energy system and environment (Russ et 
al., 2007, 18). The two models used in the JRC report rest on different datasets. The GEM-E3 
model uses data concerned with bilateral trade from the global database GTAP 7. The data used to 
make the scenarios made by POLES, related to resource availability, are taken from the United 
States Geological Survey 2000 (Russ et al., 2007, 63). 
All scenarios have assumptions attached. Because scenarios are illustrations of what might happen 
in the future, the report has to clarify the assumptions. The JRC report has outlined the assumptions 
that are fundamental for the GHG reduction scenario. For this scenario the report assumes an imper-
fect emission trading system within different sectors across the World (Russ et al., 2007, 10). The 
JRC report expects the carbon value in 2030 to reach 64 or 65 €/tCO2-eq, respectively for POLES 
and GEM E3 (Russ et al., 2007, 39-40). Additionally, the JRC report expects a substantial part of 
the developed countries’ emission reduction to be achieved through flexible mechanism e.g. Clean 
Development Mechanism, operating in the developing countries (Russ et al., 2007, 43). 
Reaching the goal of limiting the average global temperature increase to 2 degrees Celsius (to the 
level of 1990) by the year 2050 is, according to the JRC report, possible if the GHG reduction sce-
nario is followed (Russ et al., 2007, 12).  
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It will be interesting to investigate the underlying data; the methodological approach as well as the 
assumptions behind the scenarios because these are the factors determining whether the scenarios 
are put together in a reliable way. 
2.1 Problem Formulation 
 
What are the underlying assumptions and approach of the JRC report and how do these 
influence the reliability of the scenarios? 
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Project design 
The following will give an overview of the structure of the report and what the different chapters 
will contain. 
Introduction: This part will introduce the reader to the project. It will contain an introduction, 
problem area and the problem formulation. 
Methodology: This chapter will introduce critical realism, the epistemology of the project and the 
methodological approach. 
Summary of the Report: The aim of this chapter is to give an overview of the JRC report. Addi-
tionally, it will describe the two models: POLES and GEM E3 used to generate the scenarios as 
well as describe the concept of carbon market.  
Why Resources and Carbon Value: This part will be an elaboration of the focal point of this re-
port. It will present the two focus areas: Resources and Carbon Value and explain why these have 
become the main focus of interest.   
Analysis of Resources: The resources part will treat the assumptions related to resources made in 
the JRC report. It will explore the sources of data and question its validity.   
Analysis of Carbon Value: This chapter is dedicated to the analysis of the assumptions of the Car-
bon Value in the JRC. It will elaborate on ‘what is an optimal carbon value’ including sectors 
and external dimensions e.g. Clean Development Mechanism. 
Discussion: This section discusses the findings of chapter five and six in order to answer the prob-
lem formulation. Furthermore it will discuss the limitations that were left unaddressed. 
Conclusion: The conclusion will sum-up the findings and answer the problem formulation. 
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3 Methodology  
3.1 Critical Realism 
Within critical realism it is a fundamental view that the real world is what must be understood, in-
terpreted and explained and so the ontology of the research must be the focal point when determin-
ing the methodological approach (Fuglsang et al., 2009, 145). In physics, as well as chemistry or 
other natural sciences, it is possible for scientists to isolate things and through isolation their true 
nature can be determined. This is due to the nature of isolation, as it means that there can be no oth-
erworldly interferences and so the observation is done in a closed system.  
The social sciences are concerned with the social structures of the world and these structures exist 
in themselves and are therefore not relative in any way. However the social structures and mecha-
nisms are complex: both in their own potential and nature, and in the manner that they work to-
gether. They cannot really be isolated, though they may be understood better in some given situa-
tions, and so the social world is in this sense viewed as an open system. This view of the social 
world has therefore a profound influence on how epistemology and ontology should be regarded 
(Ibid.). 
When giving further contemplation on epistemology and ontology in the social sciences, the separa-
tion of the transitive and the intransitive dimensions becomes relevant.  
The transitive dimension encompasses: data, theories, models, paradigms, descriptions and analyti-
cal tools and is therefore much overlapping with epistemology (Buch-Hansen et al., 2005, 22). 
Whichever of the elements of the transitive dimension is in use is a human product and so it follows 
that it may be flawed or inaccurate. The transitive dimension is a social construction and whatever 
knowledge it may bring, will always be open to revision or editing due to the uncertain nature of the 
social world.  Critical realists can be regarded as epistemological relativists (Ibid., 35). 
As the transitive dimension is a social product, the intransitive dimension is the reality that is inves-
tigated. As mentioned above, it is the considered opinion of critical realists that there is a real world, 
and it exists independent of any epistemological viewpoint that scientists may have. One of the 
most fundamental understandings in critical realism is the view that the intransitive dimension can 
be divided into three groups, each dealing with a different 'domain' of the real world.  The domains 
of the real world can be viewed as hierarchical where the upper domains rest on the foundation of 
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the lower, but an understanding of the upper domains cannot be reduced to an understanding of the 
lower domains (Ibid., 35). The hierarchical structure is divided into three, with the empirical do-
main at the bottom (measurements, observations and experiences), the actual domain in the middle 
(conditional predictions, tendencies, similarities, phenomena) and the real domain on the top (open 
theories, hypotheses, explanation of mechanisms and causal potential) (Ibid.). 
Together, all three domains make up the real world and through understanding the three domains, 
the researcher can move closer to an understanding of the world. The real world does not change 
even though explanations of it may change and this simple view is the foundation of the critical 
realism approach (Ibid.).  
An example of such could be that once the earth was believed to be round, later on this view was 
replaced with an idea that the earth was flat, and if one ventured to the edge, one would simply fall 
off. Once again the view that the earth was round emerged but one thing always remained steady 
throughout this process of changing opinions; the actual shape of the earth. Examples such as this, 
illustrate what is meant by 'realism' in critical realism. The real world is not affected by the way that 
it is regarded by scientists. Explanations of the world and its mechanisms may well differ in differ-
ent times and epochs; critical realists are epistemo-
logical relativists but ontological realists (Ibid.).  
In critical realism scientists’ main focus is to under-
stand the real domain that consists of the mecha-
nisms and underlying structures of phenomena, but 
understanding of the real domain in an open system 
will always have elements of uncertainty.  The reli-
ability of the interpretation of any real domain, given 
the hierarchical structure of the domains, rests heav-
ily on the precision of the two lower domains. Be-
cause of this, the ontological field is in focus, as it 
determines what methods should be applied to get an 
understanding of the lower domains (the empirical and the actual) (Fuglsang et al., 2009). 
When dealing with the three domains two methods have been suggested as important to critical re-
alists; namely abstraction and retroduction (Ibid.).  
The real 
domain 
The actual 
domain 
The empirical 
domain 
Figure 1: The three domains 
 of critical realism 
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Due to the nature of open systems, it is argued that deduction does not serve as a proper tool in the 
social sciences, as it deals with the world as if a given phenomenon could be isolated and through 
isolation its properties deduced (Buch-Hansen et al., 2005). 
Deduction therefore goes against the view that the domains are too complex to be 'figured out' and it 
has been argued that retroduction is a much more suitable form of reasoning as it combines induc-
tive- and deductive reasoning. The combination results in reasoning that tries to give a logical ar-
gument based on knowledge from any lower domain, combined with supportive reasoning, which 
tries to evaluate whether there is reason to believe a conclusion to be flawed, and if so, tries to ex-
pand on the conclusion by suggesting  supplementing chains of causality. It follows that the real 
domain is very uncertain, where reason guides the scientist, and if one deals with much uncertainty 
in the actual- and empirical domain, retroduction becomes difficult to apply (Fuglsang et al., 2009).  
Abstraction turns concrete phenomena into more abstract phenomena, allowing the scientist to cre-
ate concepts that may help understand the intransitive domains in greater detail. Through concepts 
various concrete phenomena may have common properties that can be revealed. Abstraction can be 
viewed as necessary thought-experiments in the social sciences, so that the researcher creates a 
connection and understanding of phenomena by regarding its concrete and abstract characteristics 
(Ibid., 62).  
3.2 Methodological Approach and Critical Realism as seen in the Pro-
ject 
In this paper critical realism will be used as the methodological approach in order to answer the 
stated problem formulation. It will function as a way of thinking, utilising the concepts described 
above to delve into the report. Whatever models or structural connections that are found in the JRC 
report will be understood as the real domain. As shown in the above section, any understanding of 
the real domain is shaped by the understanding that the researcher has of the empirical and actual 
domain. Because of this understanding, the first step that will be taken in this paper will be to un-
derstand what are regarded as the most important aspects of the real domain. As these real domains 
are listed, attempts will be made to uncover the most important aspects of the domains and through 
this process the JRC report will be boiled down to its most important components. This process is 
inspired by the idea of abstraction where the researcher bands together concepts in a logical fashion, 
by finding common characteristics or by locating the most important ones. As a result of this proc-
ess a few selected real domains remain, which will be investigated. Investigating the real domains 
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that are picked will be to investigate the main assumptions and underlying methodology of the JRC 
report.  
Investigating these real domains means to investigate whatever within the actual and empirical do-
mains that allowed the report to use the real domains as it does. As such, critical realism will guide 
this paper from having the JRC report to have its most relevant parts.  
In order to investigate the actual and the empirical domains, critique based on scientific papers will 
be applied and investigated. Critique will be searched for by adding the retroductive line of reason-
ing to what is uncovered about the actual and the empirical domains. What critique will be used and 
what will be discarded, will be determined by comparing the critique to this papers ontological 
field, as its direct relevance for the real domain. This process will not be shown in this study, only 
its results.  
As the important critique is found, an evaluation of the points made in the critique and how these go 
against or support what is being done in the JRC report will be listed. Consideration of the empiri-
cal and actual level of the critique will be investigated and considered, and as that is done, the 
analysis can embark onto its final stage; an evaluation of how the newfound knowledge affects the 
validity of the assumptions and underlying methodology of the JRC report. Therefore it can be said 
that this report starts off by investigating the structure of the JRC report, moving on to a debate on 
the abstract concepts found, and then taking the results from there, back to the JRC report, so that it 
can be viewed in new light.  
3.3 Epistemology 
In critical realism the real world is unchanged by whatever understanding scientists may have of it 
and this understanding becomes very important when contemplating the epistemological approach 
of this paper. Critical realism is the focal point of understanding and the structures of the different 
domains in the JRC report are what are being investigated.  
The mechanisms of the real world are complex and it is because of the complexity that any model 
or prediction will have indispensible uncertainty and the JRC report is no exception. Research on 
the intransitive domain will always be influenced by factors of the transitive domain, and that is 
why this paper wishes to investigate the methods and assumptions that are found in the JRC report. 
The three domains exist but the understanding of the domains that this paper has, is not a direct re-
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flection of the real world, but an attempt to move as close to the real world and its complex mecha-
nisms as possible. 
The results of this paper therefore do not make any claim on truth regarding what the world really is 
like. This paper does not make any ultimate claims nor does it necessarily come up with better tools 
to create GHG scenarios than what is originally used. What the findings will show, are considera-
tions of the validity of the structures that the JRC report rest on, the outcome of exclusion or inclu-
sion of structures and possibly suggestions on how the JRC reports methods may be improved. 
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4 JRC report 
4.1.1 Summary of the JRC report  
The EU is determined to tackle climate change beyond the Kyoto commitment period, 
acknowledging that industrial countries must lead the attempts to reduce GHG emissions.  
The JRC supports these efforts by providing scientific data to the involved decision makers and has 
for this purpose utilised different models in collaboration with departments of the EU and experts 
from other scientific institutions. 
In order to enable a discussion about the results, methodology and key assumptions, the research 
was published as a report that contains an overview of the models that were used, an analysis of the 
scenarios and the conclusions these scenarios come to. 
Two models are used to assess technological and economic options for a reduction of GHG. One is 
the partial equilibrium energy model POLES that provides insight into the reaction of energy 
sectors on policy measures, therefore giving conclusions about the costs of GHG abatement and 
emission trading. The second model is the multi-sectorial general equilibrium model GEM-E3 that 
looks at the impact on the whole economy and can therefore be used to analyse the impact of 
climate policies on GDP and household welfare. 
The study includes three main scenarios. Firstly, a baseline scenario that assumes no additional 
energy efficiency or climate change policies (Russ et al., 2007, 26). This scenario predicts global 
GHG emissions to increase by 86 per cent from 1990 to 2050, with emissions in developing 
countries tripling. 
The next scenario is a reference scenario that builds on the baseline scenario but assumes the 
realisation of energy efficiency policies, trends that can already be observed in many countries 
(Ibid., 28).  
The third scenario, the GHG reduction scenario, builds on the reference scenario but includes more 
climate change policies and measures to achieve a reduction in global GHG emissions of 25 per 
cent by 2050 compared to 1990 (Ibid., 35).  
In the GHG reduction scenario emissions peak in 2020 and decrease from that point to 25 per cent 
below the level of 1990 by 2050, if the efforts to reduce GHG emissions are global. Otherwise even 
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a drastic decrease of GHG in developed countries would be offset by increasing emissions in 
developing nations and lead to an increase in global emissions by a third until 2050. 
It is assumed that all countries enter a global carbon market, based on emission trading, when they 
make a reduction commitment.  
The assumption that the different countries will enter at varying points in time aims to describe a 
more realistic and imperfect carbon market (Ibid., 67). 
The carbon price would rise to 65 €/t CO2-equivalent in all global industrial sectors (Ibid., 11). The 
carbon prices and energy efficient standards will have a significant influence on global energy 
production and consumption. They will trigger energy savings and efficiency improvements even 
though global energy consumption is expected to rise further. The set carbon prices in the JRC 
report will also enable a reduction in carbon intensive energy consumption and an increased use of 
technologies like carbon capture and storage (CCS). 
The average annual costs of restructuring the global energy system and limiting the increase in the 
average global temperature to two degrees Celsius (to the level of 1990) is estimated to be 0.4 per 
cent of GDP in the GHG emission reduction scenario from 2013 to 2030 and leading to a annual 
change of GDP by –0.19 per cent.  
In these calculations, developed countries are expected to purchase about one quarter of the 
emission reductions from developing countries in order to meet the targets. Assuming there is no 
trade between developed and developing countries, direct costs would nearly triple (Ibid., 12,13).  
Using probability distributions the JRC report concludes that there is a 50 per cent chance for 
reaching the two degree Celsius target with the GHG reduction scenario (Ibid., 50).  
4.2 POLES – Prospective Outlook on Long-term Energy Systems  
 
4.2.1 POLES in general 
The POLES model was originally created by the Institute of Energy Policy and Economics (IEPE, 
now called LEPII) and is continuously improved and adjusted according to changes on the energy 
market. Since 1996, several updates for the model have been released (the latest model is POLES 
6.1).  
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POLES is a recursive simulation model
1
. Its main goal is to target long-term energy, climate change 
and technological issues, being a tool for creating energy scenarios for the future (up to 2050) (En-
erdata – POLES, 2012). POLES is a partial equilibrium model, meaning that there is detailed focus 
on a specific sector of the economy (in the case of POLES the energy sector) whereas general equi-
librium models provide a more general and less detailed overview of the whole economy (Witzke et 
al., 2008, 5). Even though POLES has been used widely by different actors within Europe like the 
European Commission, the model is global. POLES divides the world into 47 regions. 31 of these 
represent countries and 16 are countries aggregates
2
 (IPTS-POLES Manual, 2010, 5).  
4.2.2 Objectives of the Model 
The model aims at minimising the uncertainties in coming developments of world energy consump-
tion and the resulting GHG emissions by the creation of baseline and reference scenarios and by 
providing a framework for global energy demand analysis. The model takes into consideration the 
supply constraints and price dynamics on international markets (Ibid., 4).  
POLES targets emission reduction strategies on an international level while taking into account the 
specific costs and contingencies of emission control in different regions and countries all over the 
world. The model enables analysis of the future GHG emissions on a quite detailed level due its 
sectoral properties. This helps identify strategic areas of action (Ibid., 4).  
POLES aims at giving an economic overview of the key new technologies and their development 
by characterising the performances and costs together with the time it takes for the technologies to 
reach a level of sufficiency (Ibid., 4).  
POLES enables an evaluation of the costs necessary to comply with the Kyoto targets both with and 
without emission trading (Ibid., 4). 
Finally, it is the objective of the model to analyse the impacts of emission reduction strategies on 
the international energy markets. There is detailed treatment on price-effects in every part of the 
model which allows for the simulation of internationalisation strategies through prices and eco-
taxes
3
 (Ibid., 5). 
                                                 
1 A simulation model is considered a mathematical model of a system/process that contains key-inputs which affect the model and outputs that are 
2  Countries aggregates consist of smaller and bigger neighboring countries with a similar socio-economic and political atmosphere (e.g. Baltic States 
and Small Mediterranean Countries).  
3Ecotaxes are taxes put on fossil fuels, nuclear energy, water consumption, emissions and waste (Weizsäcker et al.,  1992). 
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4.2.3 The Structure of the Model 
The hierarchical structure of POLES is divided into three interlinked modules at the international, 
national and regional level (Russ et al., 2007, 18). The modules are technologically detailed for en-
ergy intensive-sectors (Ibid., 18).  
The energy prices at time (t) together with exogenous factors like population growth, growth in 
GDP etc. determine demand and supply at time t+1 including time lags and delays (Lesourd et al., 
1996, 15).  
The energy demand sectors are made out of 15 branches (main industrial branches, transport modes, 
service sectors etc.) and the behavioural demand equations take into consideration the combination 
of price and revenue effects (Enerdata – POLES, 2012). 
It has to be noted that all energy prices are determined endogenously
4
 (Russ et al., 2007, 19). Ex-
ogenous input parameters of POLES include population and GDP. 
POLES distinguishes between a vertical and a horizontal integration. 
The vertical integration of the model expresses four main modules concerned with: final energy 
demand by main sectors, new and renewable energy technologies, electricity and conventional en-
ergy and transformation system and primary energy supply (the energy supply module). The verti-
cal structure enables simulation of a complete energy balance for each region (IPTS-POLES Man-
ual, 2010, 5). 
The horizontal integration of the model is expressed through the international energy markets (oil, 
gas and coal). There is only one market considered for oil following the “one great pool” concept 
while there are three regional markets (America, Asia and Europe) for coal and gas (accounting for 
different costs, markets and technical structures). The main inputs of the international energy mar-
kets are the import demands and export capacities of the different regions (IPTS-POLES Manual, 
2010, 6). 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4
 Price is changed by the producers according to demand and demand is changed by consumers according to price. 
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4.2.4 POLES Model in the JRC Report 
POLES is the primary model used for creating the three scenarios (baseline scenario, reference sce-
nario and GHG reduction scenario) in the JRC report and focuses on the greenhouse gas emitting 
sectors. POLES is used to give a detailed overview of how the energy sectors respond to the as-
sumed climate policy and the incurred direct costs like abatement and trading costs. The model is 
used to cover all energy related GHG emissions as well as industrial emissions with the exception 
of agriculture- and land-use related emissions.
5
 
The scenarios in the JRC report are created until 2050 largely so as to stay in line with the time-
frame of POLES. Moreover, different time frames have been created for the scenarios in order to 
allow for the uptake of new technologies, which are slow due to long investment horizons (Russ et 
al., 2007, 18). 
                                                 
5 
The version of the model used for creating the scenarios in the JRC report did not include emissions from agriculture, 
land use and changes in land use. These were calculated with other models. 
Figure 2: The POLES model (Source: IPTS-POLES Manual, 2010, 6) 
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4.3 GEM E3 - General Equilibrium Model for Economy, Energy and 
Environment 
GEM-E3 is a multi-sectoral general equilibrium model that covers the interactions between the 
economy, the energy system and the environment (IPTS – GEM-E3 Model, 2012). It covers all pro-
duction sectors and institutional sectors of the economy and represents 37 world regions and 24 
European countries (E
3 
M Lab, n.d., 1). The geographical regions are linked through bilateral trade6.  
There are two versions of the model: GEM-E3 World and GEM-E3 Europe. Both versions have the 
same specifications but differ in their geographical coverage. GEM-E3 World uses the GTAP 7 
database (a public global database from 2004 containing complete bilateral trade information 
(GTAP, 2012)) and enables a representation of all the major economies in the world. GEM-E3 
Europe focuses on the 24 EU countries and to a lesser degree the rest of the world while using data 
from EUROSTAT (provides statistics for EU and its candidate states (EUROSTAT, 2012) (IPTS – 
GEM-E3 model, 2012). 
The purpose of the GEM-E3 model is to evaluate the distributional effects of policies for all the 
sectors of the economy. Furthermore it is a great tool for analysing the economical impact on envi-
ronmental and economic policies while securing global equilibrium in the world economy (Ciscar et 
al., 2012, 6). 
Global equilibrium is determined endogenously by market prices. The model calculates the equilib-
rium prices in the goods and services markets as well as for the market of labour and capital (pro-
duction factors) using empirical data (IPTS-GEM-E3 model, 2012). The equilibriums for energy 
demand and supply and emission abatement are also computed (Ibid.). The calculations are done in 
accordance to the Walras law which states that if there is excess supply in one market, there must be 
excess demand in another market so that the markets would balance out (Investopedia – Walras 
Law, 2012). Thereby the model integrates micro-economic behaviour (supply and demand from 
households and firms) into a macro-economic framework.  
The output of the model includes: capital flows, government revenues, household consumption, 
input-output tables, employment, energy use and atmospheric emissions (Russ et al., 2007). Eco-
nomic factors like welfare for households and cost for firms are optimised according to their 
purpose and the supply or demand of different goods (capital, labour, energy) are determined 
separately (IPTS-GEM-E3 Model, 2012). The products demanded by households, firms as well as 
                                                 
6
 Bilateral trade: the exchange of goods between two countries (Investopedia-Bilateral Trade, 2012) 
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the public sector stand for the total domestic demand. The total demand is divided between 
domestic goods and imported goods, in accordance to the Armington Specification
7
 (E3 M Lab, 
n.d., 19). Each country imports goods at the prices set by the supplying countries in regards to their 
export supply behaviour. To minimise cost the demander mixes domestic and imported goods 
(Ibid., 19).  
4.3.1 GEM E3 model in the JRC Report 
The purpose of using the GEM-E3 model in the report: ‘Global Climate Policy Scenarios for 2030 
and beyond’ is to analyse what impact a reduction of GHG emissions, according to the scenarios 
made by the POLES model, will have on the different sectors of the economy. The model examines 
the interactions within the sectors (energy, economy and environment) and the value of trade be-
tween regions (Russ et al., 2007, 17).  
It is thereby a tool to measure the degree of economic adjustments that need to be done to reach the 
goal of limiting the global temperature increase to two degrees Celsius by 2050. Especially changes 
in GDP and welfare are used as measures of the magnitude of adjustments (Ibid., 65).  
The development of carbon markets is essential in the report ‘Global Climate Policy Scenarios for 
2030 and beyond’, but whereas carbon markets are represented by price differentials in the POLES 
model, the GEM-E3 model examines the markets by “varying the timing of the entry of a coun-
try/grouping in the global carbon market” (Ibid., 67) It is stated in the JRC report that it is assumed 
that all the countries will enter the carbon market once they are committed to the reduction target 
(Ibid., 67). 
It is important to note that the time horizons for the two models differ. The scenarios in the POLES 
model have been developed until the year 2050 whereas the GEM-E3 model has a more limited 
time frame, only up to the year 2030 due to model constrains (Ibid., 17-18).  
4.4 Carbon market 
The Stern Review (2006) on climate change suggests three sets of policy instruments necessary to 
facilitate low-carbon transition: technology policy, targeted regulation with transparent and shared 
information and putting a price on carbon (Neuhoff, 2011, 5). 
                                                 
7
Armington specification concerns the elasticity of substitution across goods and the price elasticity of demand under 
the assumption of a large number of varieties, systematically changes from one importer country to another in an inter-
national trade context (Yilmazkuday, 2009, 1). 
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The lack of a price that signals the increasing scarcity value of the atmosphere as a sink for GHG 
emissions is one of the most important reasons for the problem of climate change. It leads to a lack 
of incentive to reduce emissions, as the market fails to recognise the scarcity (Ellerman et al., 2010, 
2). 
There are two ways to put a price on carbon: to introduce environmental taxes, whereby a tax is 
levied on every unit of emissions produced, or to use emission trading, a market-based policy 
instrument (Ibid., 2). 
Cap-and-trade schemes have proven to be the better mechanism to guarantee International 
participation that allows greater flexibility about ‘what, where and when’ emissions are reduced. 
This would lead to a decrease of the costs involved with a GHG reduction (Stern, 2006, 472). 
European countries have previously failed to agree on an equal carbon tax but managed to establish 
a common emission trading scheme, which was seen more as an environmental policy rather than a 
fiscal policy (Wråke et al., 2012, 12). 
4.4.1 Emission Trading 
Emission trading schemes set an overall cap of permitted emissions for a unit of time and allocate 
certificates of permits (allowances) to emitters that equal the cap. Emitters can generate the 
emissions they hold allowances for, if pollution exceeds their allowances they have to buy 
certificates from emitters who used less allowances than they hold. This puts a price on a unit of 
pollution that creates an incentive to reduce emissions.  In theory, agents covered by a quantity 
ceiling (firms, countries or individuals) can choose how and where to deliver emission reductions 
and therefore the reductions needed to meet the cap are expected to be achieved at close to 
minimum cost to the overall economy (Ellerman et al., 2010, 3). 
When introducing a trading scheme the scope of coverage (the gases and sectors to be included) and 
the level (upstream or downstream)
8
 to which coverage applies has to be decided  (Ibid., 4). 
 
                                                 
8
Upstream: first sellers of carbon-based fuels would be required to buy permits. Amount of carbon flowing into the 
economy depends on these first sellers. 
Downstream: End users of fossil fuels. (Barnes, 2007) 
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5 Why 'Resources' and 'Carbon Value' 
As was shown previously, when summing up the methodological approach of the JRC report, three 
areas were the most interesting to look at; the POLES model, the GEM-E3 model and the of 
concept carbon value.  In order to understand the major assumptions and methodology of the JRC 
report, the focus of this paper would therefore be found within the three above mentioned areas. 
Carbon value (also referred to as carbon pricing) is a tool that has been applied throughout the 
whole process in the JRC report and through this application the carbon emission reduction 
requirement is expected to be met. Because of carbon pricing’s influence on the JRC results, it was 
decided as a necessary thing to focus on. This focus allowed this paper to comment on the most 
important factor of how the JRC report will reach its goals. However there seemed to be an equally 
important part of the JRC report that too has profound influence on the results. This part is in this 
paper named 'resources' and it refers to the resource supply module in the POLES model.  The 
module concerns data on the fossil fuels oil, gas and coal. The resource module seemed obvious to 
look at given resources’ important role in history. Fossil fuels initiated the industrial revolution and 
the exploitation of fossil fuels has shaped the modern world. In the JRC report a transition away 
from oil, gas and coal to a certain degree is expected, but to make any predictions for such a 
transition, understanding the resource availability that created the environmental problem to begin 
with is in this paper deemed imperative.  
This paper therefore moves its focus on the two concepts of 'resources' and 'carbon value'. The two 
will be investigated in the following chapter, where the underlying assumptions and understanding 
will be examined and their influence on the JRC reports results evaluated.  
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6 Resources 
The following chapter focuses on resources as treated in the resource supply module in POLES. The 
data sources used within this module are explored in the first section of this chapter. Further sec-
tions include contemplation on the assumptions that the sources use, through an evaluation of op-
posing schools of thought when it comes to resource reserve questions. The last part of the chapter 
discusses the implications that these opposing schools of thought have on the results of the JRC 
report and illuminates the underlying assumptions and methods on resources in the JRC report. A 
limitation section of this papers analysis is added in the very end, showing what was left out as well 
as the consequences for doing so. 
6.1 Treatment of Resources (Fossil Fuels) in the JRC Report and in 
POLES 
The JRC report views resources through the POLES resource supply module. Three fossil fuels are 
in focus: oil, gas and coal. Oil and gas supply in the model are dealt with a discovery process model 
while the supply of coal is demand driven (IPTS-POLES Manual, 2010, 23). This means that it is 
assumed that a focus on oil and gas reserves is a necessity for the JRC report, while coal is in such 
abundance that a consideration on coal reserves is unnecessary given the time frame of the scenar-
ios.  The JRC report measures data for oil availability in Ultimately Recoverable Resources (URR)
9
 
taken from the United States Geological Survey 2000 (USGS 2000) (Russ et al., 2007, 63). The 
resource supply module in POLES functions as an exogenous factor connected to the endogenous 
resource market module. The resource market is a part of the feedback loop that allows the POLES 
model to create carbon reduction scenarios. Because of the direct impact that the resource module 
has on the feedback loop in the POLES model, the way that the JRC report views resources and 
their scarcity will have a big influence on the scenario conclusions. Oil price is calculated in the 
                                                 
9
 Ultimately Recoverable Resources (URR) can be defined for a single field or a country/region. URR for a single field 
is the sum of cumulative production (how much oil has been extracted to date) and recoverable reserves (the amount oil 
that can be pumped out before a field has to be abandoned). URR for a country/region is the sum of cumulative 
production, recoverable reserves and yet-to-find (estimate on the quantity of oil that is left to be discovered and pumped 
out). (ASPO-International, 2008) (Campbell et al., 1998, 79) 
Group 16  SIB 21.2 Spring 2012 
 
Page 27 of 73 
 
JRC report as a function of the reserves-to-production ratio
10
 and is dependent on the consumption 
and availability of oil (Ibid., 63).  
In this paper there will be made no larger distinctions between oil and gas, but the chief focus will 
be on oil. Coal will not be focused on and the reason for not doing so will be elaborated briefly in 
the limitations section. 
As oil consumption and price are closely related to oil availability it was essential to investigate the 
USGS 2000 Survey as the source for the data on oil availability used in the JRC report. The scope 
for doing so was to explore the methodology and estimates that the USGS 2000 survey has come up 
with, inserting these into the global discussion on oil reserve estimates in order to get a better un-
derstanding of the validity and reliability of the data and its influence on the JRC report. Further 
sections of this chapter will focus on the USGS 2000 survey and the underlying concepts. 
6.2 USGS 2000 
6.2.1 The General Scope of the USGS and the Previous Assessments 
The United States Geological Survey is a U.S. based research institute that conducts periodical geo-
logical assessments on the world oil and gas resources. It is the general aim of the USGS to provide 
impartial, scientifically based petroleum-resource information due to its overall societal importance 
and for the economic security of the U.S. (Schmocker et al., (RV), 2000, 1). The USGS has carried 
out several assessments before the 2000 World Petroleum Assessment in the period of 1984-1994 
(1984, 1987, 1991 and 1994). The researches of the USGS state to have been using the same meth-
odology throughout all the assessments and thus characterise all changes in results as due to devel-
opment in the understanding of the world recoverable oil and gas resources. Moreover, the assess-
ments are based on geologic studies and not statistical analysis (USGS, (ES), 2000, 1). 
 The previous assessments for undiscovered conventional oil
11
 resources are stated not to have 
changed a lot during the 4 previous assessments. Rather, there was an increase of the total identified 
discovered reserves by a total of 379 BBO (Billion Barrels of Oil). The USGS states that this in-
                                                 
10
 Reserves-to-Production ratio is used to indicate the relationship between an amount of known resource and amount of 
resource used per year. Measured in years it is used by governments and agencies in order to predict the future 
availability of a resource in order to plan and determine different economical variables (income, employment etc.) 
(Investopedia-Reserves to Production Ratio, 2012) 
11
Conventional oil is defined differently in many places. Greene et al. (2005) define conventional oil as liquid 
hydrocarbons of light and medium gravity and viscosity that exist in porous and permeable reservoirs while Laherrère 
defines conventional oil as having light and medium gravity but no viscosity. The USGS define conventional oil 
similarly to Greene at al. as discrete accumulations bounded by water contact. (Greene et al., 2005, 516) (Laherrère, 
2001, 4) (Klett et al., (GL), 2000, 2) 
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crease happened despite the declining success of converting undiscovered resources to identified 
reserves and the production of 245 BBO through the removal from identified reserves. The USGS 
interprets the previous assessments to indicate that most of the world oil yet to be produced can be 
found in fields already discovered and that together with the growing estimations from the past sur-
veys reserve growth
12
 from discovered oil fields has been “…chronically under assessed” (Ibid., 2). 
Similarly to oil, estimates for undiscovered conventional gas increased with the assessments made 
before the USGS 200o survey. However, it was also stated that the process of moving from undis-
covered to discovered unconventional gas lags that of oil and on the contrary to oil the USGS be-
lieves that a significant amount of gas for future production will be extracted from yet undiscovered 
fields (Ibid., 2). 
6.2.2 USGS WORLD PETROLEUM ASSESSMENT 2000  
The USGS 2000 survey differs from the four first surveys in that there is much more focus on re-
serve growth and it is also the first time that reserve growth is quantitatively assessed.  Neverthe-
less, there are also other improvements that need to be brought fourth. It is important to note that as 
reserve growth is so essential to the USGS 2000 survey it is most likely that these other improve-
ments have been made in order to accommodate reserve growth.  
The USGS 2000 survey presents estimates for the quantities of oil, gas and NGL (natural gas liq-
uids). The main purpose of the USGS 2000 survey was to focus on the world reserves estimates 
using the same methodology as was used for estimating the U.S. reserves. The initial interest for 
this was due to the fact that in the past the U.S. estimates of oil and gas reserves (cumulative pro-
duction and remaining reserves) had been too low which initiated interest in exploring reserve 
growth in order to predict the potential quantities of oil and gas that could be added to reserves in 
the future on a global scale (USGS, (ES), 2000, 1). A 30-year time-span was opted for the USGS 
2000 survey, which was an addition compared to the previous assessments. The USGS emphasises 
that it is the potential estimates that are being predicted and that there is a considerable amount of 
uncertainty involved. It is stated that to try and predict the actual volumes of petroleum would re-
quire future predictions of the whole petroleum industry with all its details (Schmoker et al., (RG), 
2000, 8). However, as studies on reserve growth estimates had not been done before the USGS 
                                                 
12
 Reserve Growth will be explained in further detail later but is defined in the USGS context as: “The increases in 
known petroleum volume that commonly occur as oil and gas fields are developed and produced…” (Klett et al., (GL), 
2000, 6). 
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2000 survey the USGS claims that despite uncertainty and differing methodology (from the rest of 
the world) it was still relevant to conduct the survey with the data available to them.  
One of the key assumptions in the study was played by the ‘age of fields’13, which was used as an 
alternate measure for various technical activities (pressure maintenance, equipment improvement 
etc.) (Schmoker et al., (RG), 2000, 2). It is stated that reserve growth is sensitive to field age in that 
reserve growth is inclined to decrease in the older fields. The reverse applies for younger fields but 
is stated to be considerably more difficult to estimate. As also mentioned earlier, the USGS believes 
most of the future additions in volumes to come from already discovered fields from which it could 
be concluded that the future field growth estimates are more accurate as the majority of the fields 
are discovered (older). Another assumption was incorporating past modelling patterns in the future 
reserve growth modelling. The previous was done to simplify the modelling process as effects of 
individual factors on reserve growth were stated to be difficult to analyse (Schmoker et al., (RG), 
2000, 2). 
Reserve growth was estimated for conventional resources and unconventional resources such as tar 
deposits, oil shale’s, gas hydrates, etc. were excluded stating that these will unlikely contribute sig-
nificantly to the petroleum reserves during the 30-year time-span (Ahlbrandt et al., (AR), 2000, 7). 
The USGS 2000 survey assessed reserve growth individually for oil and gas fields considering their 
field-age and applying the same reserve growth function
14
. This resulted in excluding factors like: 
regional and local variability of reporting systems, reserves definitions and technical, economic and 
political conditions, which were all stated as factors that influence reserve growth. Moreover, as the 
aim of the study was to predict world potential reserve growth, it was done so only at the world 
level (Schmoker et al., (RG), 2000, 5). 
In the U.S. oil and gas production data from field operators need to be reported to the U.S. Depart-
ment of Energy. It is also required that operators provide an estimate on proved
15
 reserves which are 
quite strict in their definition. The USGS believe the latter to strengthen the quality of the historical 
data when modelling potential reserve growth. Moreover, the reporting requirements for the rest of 
                                                 
13
 Years since discovery (Shmoker et al., 2000, 1) 
14
 A reserve growth function is: ”...a numerical model for predicting the future sizes of existing oil and gas fields; it is 
composed of reserve-growth factors that are applied to known field sizes to obtain reserve growth estimates.” 
(Schmoker et al., (RG), 2000, 9) 
15
 Proved reserves are usually referred to when there is reasonable certainty that they can be recovered profitably at 
current oil and gas prices. These are usually cited as probability percentages (for example P90 for probability 90 per 
cent) (Campbell et al., 1998, 80) 
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the world differ or are non-existent which makes estimating potential reserve growth difficult and 
the estimates uncertain (Schmoker et al., (RG), 2000, 2). 
The USGS 2000 survey uses probability distributions
16
 in order to deal with the uncertainty that 
arises from basing a world reserve-growth forecast on analogical U.S. models.  
Figure 3 shows the methodology used in the assessment in order to estimate world potential reserve 
growth.  
 
 
 
 
As also shown on the lower part of Figure 3 a reserve growth function is applied to each field and 
summed and differences between grown and known volumes calculated. The previous results in a 
point estimate of world potential reserve growth (for each commodity: oil, gas, NGL) from which 
more and less optimistic point estimates (on world potential reserve growth) are chosen. Finally, 
probability distribution types for oil, gas and NGL are selected and point estimates equated to set 
                                                 
16
Probability distributions appear as uncertainty of a fixed but unknown value (Schmoker et al., (RG), 2000, 13) 
Figure 3: Simplified flow diagram emphasizing the basic steps used to obtain a forecast of 
world potential reserve growth for the USGS World Petroleum Assessment 2000 (Schmoker et 
al., (RG), 2000, Figure 3) 
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minimum, median and maximum fractiles, which then represent the magnitude and uncertainty 
range of world potential reserve growth (Schmoker et al., (RG), 2000, 17). 
 
 
 
 
The results of the USGS 2000 survey are presented in Figure 5 below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Graphical depiction of the forecast strategy for world potential reserve growth, 
with uncertainty expressed in the form of a symmetrical triangular probability distribution 
(Schmoker et al., (RG), 2000, Figure 2). 
 
Figure 5: Known volumes of petroleum and the corresponding grown volumes (excluding the 
U.S.) estimated for the year 2025. (The expected mean potential reserve growth for the 30-year 
forecast span is the difference between the grown and knwon volumes) 
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The results of the USGS 2000 survey state that (excluding the U.S.) the mean expected volumes of 
undiscovered resources are 649 barrels of oil (BBO), 4669 cubic feet of gas and 207 billion barrels 
of NGL. The estimated mean additions to reserves from potential reserve growth are 612 BBO, 
3305 cubic feet of gas and 42 billion barrels of NGL. The estimates on potential additions to re-
serves from reserve growth imply that 75 per cent of the world’s grown conventional oil and 66 per 
cent of the world’s grown conventional gas endowment have already been discovered in areas as-
sessed (not including the U.S.) (USGS, (ES), 2000, 1). 
The survey also provides reasons for why the reserve growth estimations (U.S. based historical re-
serve growth function) might be under- or overestimated. This is done to further stress that the 
USGS is aware of the uncertainties involved in firstly estimating reserve growth but also in differ-
ing data and rules and regulations for estimates in the rest of the world. The estimations are stated to 
possibly be overestimated: due to less restrictive engineering criteria, due to deliberate overstate-
ments of the potential of future reserve growth by other countries (than the U.S.) or due to some 
fields having more accurate initial reserves estimations (than the U.S.) (Schmoker et al., (RG), 
2000, 13). The estimations are stated to possibly be underestimated: due to the possibility of other 
(world) fields being younger than the ones in the U.S., due to future reserve growth benefitting from 
better technology than from that used in the U.S. historical reserve growth or due to petroleum 
shortages forcing oil producers to develop reserve growth faster than the U.S. during the past dec-
ades (Schmoker et al., (RG), 2000, 12). 
6.3 The USGS 2000 Survey and the JRC Report 
The JRC report has retrieved data for oil and gas availability from the USGS 2000 survey. As stated 
earlier in the chapter it was essential to explore the methodology and results of the USGS 2000 sur-
vey in order to see its influence on the JRC report. The USGS 2000 survey included several aspects 
that might be conflicting with the JRC report. Firstly, the USGS 2000 survey states to be using a 
time-span of 30 years up to 2025 for estimating potential additions to oil and gas reserves. It is ar-
gued for by stating that it is a reasonable maximum on its own right and that estimating improve-
ments in technology beyond the 30-year scope would exceed that limit. The time-span might prove 
to be problematic for the oil and gas availability data in the JRC report as the POLES model uses a 
time-span that is 25 years longer (until 2050). Secondly, even though the USGS researchers state 
that there is a lot of uncertainty in regards to the number and volume of oil and gas reservoirs in the 
whole world, their methodology is the same for the rest of the world as it is for the U.S. and they 
admit that the way oil and gas reserves are estimated in the rest of the world might differ greatly 
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from the U.S. This indicates the possibility that the data provided for the world (excluding the U.S.) 
oil and gas reserves in the USGS 2000 survey might be under- or overestimated. Thus the data on 
oil and gas availability used in the JRC report might consequently be an under- or overestimation. 
Finally, the most prevalent aspect in the USGS 2000 survey appears to be reserve growth estima-
tions. These are stated to provide almost as much ‘new’ oil in the next 30 years as will be provided 
by the discoveries of conventional fields. The notion of reserve growth became thus interesting and 
vital to research further. The further chapters will focus on critique on the USGS 2000 survey, re-
serve growth and different view-points in connection to it.  
6.4 Critique on the USGS 2000 Survey by Laherrère 
The most prevalent critique on the USGS 2000 survey available appears to be by Jean Laherrère, a 
former petroleum engineer for the French petroleum company Total S.A. and a current member of 
the Association of the Study of Peak Oil and Gas. In his critique entitled ‘Is USGS 2000 assessment 
reliable?’ Laherrère brings out several reasoned arguments for why the USGS 2000 survey might be 
faulty. The most important arguments for the current study will be presented below. 
The critique approaches both the estimates for undiscovered amounts of conventional oil, gas and 
NGL and estimates for potential reserve growth. 
Firstly, Laherrère addresses the error made in summing the minimum probability values, which 
result in a smaller number than the minimum value of the total reserve growth estimates. Laherrère 
notes that instead mean probability values should be summed, which would then be in accordance 
with statistical theory. Moreover, Laherrère argues that it is not reasonable to assume that every 
field will only discover the minimum estimate. He further states that Proved reserves are generally 
defined as a P90 value which differs from the P95 value used by the USGS. Essentially Laherrère 
contributes the errors in probability estimates to inconsistent methodology (the USGS treats the 
U.S. differently from the rest of the world). While he accepts that the U.S. probability values are 
bound by strict rules when using a probabilistic approach, he argues that the USGS 2000 survey 
should have first adjusted the Proved values of the U.S. to the Proved and Probable
17
 values in the 
rest of the world.  
Secondly, Laherrère argues that previous USGS studies have provided better explanations of meth-
odology but that the methodology has stayed more or less the same. Laherrère suggests that using 
                                                 
17
 Proved and Proved and Probable values will be elaborated on further in the section: ‘The Pessimists’. 
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an un-named panel of experts is likely to be the reason why the P5
18
 values are extraordinarily high 
which additionally may have influenced the mean values.  
Finally and most importantly, Laherrère argues that the USGS 2000 survey estimates on reserve 
growth are largely excessive. He places his arguments on: previously reported estimates, complica-
tions from differentiating between proved and proved and probable reserves and improvements in 
technology.  Laherrère first maintains that the U.S. (as well as Canada), in order to meet the rules 
for the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) need to report proved values for reserves, 
which in time grow closer to their mean values. Over a period of 20 years the original proved values 
are stated to have had a probability of around 66 per cent which was close to the mode
19
 value. 
Laherrère claims that the estimated large reserve growth of the U.S. is a result of faulty initial esti-
mations of P90 values which in fact were closer to P50 values. This is also supported by the claim 
that only 6 per cent of the additions to reserves have come from new discoveries. Laherrère then 
argues that the SEC rules are old and were more applicable when most of the production was done 
onshore. As the current situation is the opposite (most production happens offshore), the industry 
requires more precise knowledge on what the fields will actually deliver and thus using proved and 
probable estimates is more appropriate.  
Laherrère states that even though technology is an important factor in reserve growth, the reported 
impact is misguided. He argues that in reality reserve estimates made prior to drilling are almost 
always higher than those attributed to the discovery. Laherrère claims that reserve growth is rather a 
reporting phenomenon due to political and economical incentives
20
 and not because of technology 
as is often thought. Furthermore, Laherrère claims that many of the new technologies are no longer 
new and have in fact been routinely applied to most modern fields for years.  
In conclusion, Laherrère’s critique suggests that the USGS 2000 survey estimates highly optimistic 
values for undiscovered oil, gas and NGL as well as potential reserve growth. The excessive estima-
tions are claimed to have failed to respect the evidence of past discovery regarding amounts and 
rates and are many times bigger than what other surveys have estimated. Moreover, Laherrère be-
lieves that it is highly unlikely that technological achievements will be able to deliver the estimates 
presented by the USGS 2000 survey over the 30-year time-span. 
                                                 
18
 Probability that these reserves will in reality be the volume stated is 5 per cent. 
19
 Defined as the peak of the density of probability curve or as the most likely case (Laherrère, 2000). 
20
 Laherrère brings out that large reserve growth estimates (also referred to as “political” reserves) like those (300 extra 
GBO) added by OPEC countries in the late 1980’s in order to gain more production quota, should not be confused with 
reserve growth due to technological advancements (Laherrère, 2000). 
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6.5 Schools on Reserves  
The data and methodology of the USGS 2000 survey presented earlier together with Laherrère’s 
strong contrasting view-points raised the interest to examine reasons behind these opposing views 
on resource availability and estimates. The previous lead the current study to distinguish between 
two schools of thought on reserves: the pessimists and the optimists. Characteristics for both 
schools will be presented in the following chapter and the differences between the two will be out-
lined. It should be noted though that the current study refers to these schools and researchers in-
volved in them as optimists and pessimists as it is done the same way in other discussions on oil and 
gas reserves so as to clearly distinguish between them and not due to any bias the authors of this 
study might have. 
6.5.1 The Pessimists 
The fundamental thought of the pessimistic view-point lies in the belief that oil resources are close 
to their peak and thus it is essential to be as precise as possible when analysing the discovery and 
production of world oil fields.  
Campbell and Laherrère state in their 1998 article ‘The End of Cheap Oil’ that reports published by 
the oil industry make three critical errors in their reserve estimates. Firstly, the estimates of reserves 
are often stated to be misleading. Secondly, these reports generally rely on the understanding that 
production will remain constant. Lastly, there is a general apprehension that oil from decreasing 
reserves can be extracted at the same speed rate as for younger fields. These three errors will be 
further explained in the following section.  
The pessimists assume that from an economical point-of-view the issue of remaining oil reserves 
becomes relevant when oil production begins to decrease (Campbell et al., 1998, 78). 
Campbell et al. stress the importance of relevant statistics and thus believe that the URR should 
contain as exact values of cumulative production, reserves estimates and undiscovered field esti-
mates as possible. It is stated that while statistics for cumulative production
21
 is easily retrievable, 
coming up with good estimates for reserves includes a lot of uncertainty that in the view of pessi-
mists is not critically accounted for. The latter is why probability values are assigned to reserves 
estimates. These correspond to probability percentages where P90 would indicate a probability of 
90 per cent (also often referred to as proved reserves), P10 would refer to a 10 per cent probability 
and P50 to a 50 per cent probability (also called the median estimate and often referred to as proved 
                                                 
21
 “Most experts agree that the industry had removed just over 800 GBO from the earth at the end of 1997” (Campbell 
et al., 1998, 79). 
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and probable reserves). It is though claimed that often oil producers and countries are intentionally 
ambiguous when reporting reserve estimates and choose the probability value that enables a raise in 
the oil price of the company (Campbell et al., 1998, 79). Moreover, the rules for the definition of 
reserves (proved or proved and probable) differ from one region to another, causing further discrep-
ancies in the estimates of reserves. In the view of pessimists, the only correct way to report prob-
ability values is as proved and probable meaning that the average estimates for each field are 
summed up (Campbell et al., 1998, 80).  
Pessimists further claim that in order to accurately account for the size of ultimate recovery
22
 
knowledge on if and how fast reserves are either increased or decreased is required (Campbell et al., 
1998, 80). Pessimists maintain that around 80 per cent of the oil produced today is retrieved from 
older fields (discovered before 1973) and that the majority of them are declining. It is though ac-
knowledged that official figures often state an inclining trend but pessimists claim these figures not 
to be truthful and rather influenced by a political and economical agenda (Campbell et al., 1998, 
80).  Consequently pessimists agree with and often use the Hubbert curve
23
 in order to support their 
claims. The Hubbert curve theory is proven and justified to pessimists as it quite accurately pre-
dicted the peaking of oil production in the U.S. in 1970 and has followed the Hubbert curve patterns 
with minor alterations since then. It is further stated that the former Soviet Union and all oil produc-
ers outside the Middle East also follow the curve with minor deviations (Campbell et al., 1998, 81).  
 
 
 
                                                 
22
 ”All the cheap oil there is to be had.” (Campbell et al., 1998,80) 
23
 Created and named by M. King Hubbert in 1956 the theory claims that unrestricted extraction of a finite resource 
follows a bell-shaped curve that peaks when half of the resource has been depleted (Campbell et al., 1998, 81). 
Figure 6: Global production of oil (both conventional and unconventional) following a 
Hubbert curve. Source: Campbell et al., 1998, 81) 
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While pessimists agree and acknowledge that new technological advancements contribute to the 
ability to more effectively (considering both the volume and time) retrieve oil, they reject overly 
optimistic accounts
24
 on new technology as firstly they argue that technology depends largely on 
how precise the reporting technique is and secondly, technological process is routinely accounted 
for when reserve estimates are calculated (Campbell et al., 1998, 82).  
Finally, pessimists find it hard to agree with an optimistic view that unconventional oil
25
 can substi-
tute that of conventional once the price rise enables it. While pessimists agree that the estimated 
reserves for unconventional oil are sufficient and could theoretically be used as substitutes, they 
believe that there is not enough time or finance to prove unconventional oil to be applicable as an 
acceptable substitute. (Campbell et al., 1998, 82) 
 
6.5.2 The Optimists 
Optimists believe technological innovation and market forces to prove resource limitations to be 
insignificant (Greene et al., 2005, 515). They largely reject the pessimistic approach of statistically 
and quantitatively assessing oil peaking. Greene et al. actually goes as far as to state: “...from the 
optimists perspective, why waste time analyzing an irrelevancy?” (Greene et al., 2005, 516). The 
previous leaves an impression that optimists tend to accept technological innovation as a fact that 
does not require statistical quantitative assessing.  
Lynch, a widely recognised optimist expresses in his 2002 study ‘Forecasting oil supply: theory and 
practice’ that the Hubbert curve theory is merely defined by geology and chemistry and thus leaves 
no room for economics. Lynch brings forth that despite the accuracy of Hubbert’s 1970 prediction, 
his 2000 forecasts for the U.S. gas and oil production where respectively 65 per cent and 50 per cent 
too low. Lynch believes the latter to prove the unreliability of the Hubbert curve theory. He also 
maintains that the URR predictions are not a static but a dynamic variable and that the URR in real-
ity refers to the proportion of the total resource which is not recoverable and not a fixed amount of 
total resources. Moreover, Lynch argues that many pessimistic models show an excessive rate of oil 
production decline. Lynch rejects this by claiming that the depletion rate is overstated thus defend-
ing the validity of official figures provided by oil companies and dismissing the pessimistic bias of 
the existence of a political and economical agenda for profit gain. 
                                                 
24
 Since the 1960’s a general unclaimed criterion has been assumed that 40-50 per cent of oil in a field is recoverable 
(an increase from an initial 30 per cent) (Campbell et al., 1998, 82). 
25
 Tar sands, shale deposits etc. 
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Greene et al. also claims the Hubbert curve theory to be overly mechanistic and defend the optimis-
tic view-points by arguing that if peaking occurs it will be determined by economics and technology 
and not by geology (Greene et al., 2006, 519). Optimistic approaches prefer the reserves-to-
production ratio to the Hubbert curve theory claiming that once proved reserves are no longer able 
to fulfil the production requirement then unconventional resources will fill in the non-producible 
requirement. The latter opposes the Hubbert curve theory’s bell shaped curve as with reserves-to-
production ratio no decline in production is assumed (Greene et al., 2006, 519).  
Greene et al. additionally use the USGS 2000 survey as an example of an optimistic approach and 
recognise the time-span and emphasis the USGS 2000 survey has put on technological progress.  
Optimists consider there to be a transition underway to unconventional oil. Together with liquid 
hydrocarbon fuels it is stated to have great potential for replacing petroleum in transportation fuels. 
Though, arguments and reasoning for the latter are not provided (Greene et al., 2006, 516). 
6.5.3 Differences in the Optimist and Pessimist Schools 
Optimists and pessimists are essentially differentiated as economists and geologists respectively. 
Thus, optimists place considerably less if any value on statistical and historical methodology for oil 
availability estimates. Moreover, pessimists are substantially more critical towards uncertainty and 
are less prone to accept estimate figures if they seem overly excessive. Pessimists are confident in 
claiming the significance of peak oil and stress that the peak of conventional resources will happen 
rather sooner than later while optimists believe in price development mechanisms, technology  and 
substitution (to unconventional resources) to solve problems with resource scarcity before peak oil 
really arrives.  
6.6 Resources as viewed in JRC 
The JRC report as mentioned earlier rests on data from the USGS 2000 survey when accessing the 
resource supply module of POLES. The data from the USGS is used to help determine the price on 
the resources (oil, gas and coal), which is necessary to know if serious transition projections from 
the baseline scenario to the GHG reduction scenario (see POLES model) occur.  The USGS create 
their forecasts by applying observations on oil field behaviour done in the U.S., to the rest of the 
world and such fits the JRC reports declared goal: to create a global carbon emission reduction sce-
nario. 
 As seen previously, the USGS approach is not without its plausible disadvantages when approach-
ing oil field development through this method, as it might end up reflecting huge overestimations of 
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URR. With much overestimated URR, the projections on how the market will behave and affect the 
transition to carbon emission reduction will be both distorted and overly optimistic. Whether the 
USGS truly show overestimations built on flawed methodology or a decent picture of the URR is in 
its essence a question that is not directly answerable given the in-built uncertainty of future predic-
tions.  
This research indicates that the debate can be divided into the opposing schools of pessimists and 
optimists. The pessimists’ view that reserve growth is highly problematic as well their claim on 
eminent peak oil (or generally Hubbert curve arguments) opposed to the optimists technology and 
substitution solution to any resource availability questions. The JRC report’s standpoint within this 
division is not as easily made though, as it shares arguments from both groups. On one hand the 
JRC report allows its forecasts to rest on the notion that new technology will develop as it becomes 
cost effective (this can be for instance seen as the exogenous technology factor in the POLES 
model) but on the other hand the JRC report openly accepts that a discussion on the URR is neces-
sary (as seen in the resource module in POLES). Furthermore, oil prices in the JRC report are calcu-
lated through a reserves-to-production ratio function which further points to the report taking an 
optimistic approach. As far as substitution the JRC report only makes a minor rather general attempt 
on making forecasts that rest on the use of substitutions such as a transition from conventional re-
sources to unconventional with a lower carbon content and that in regards to switching from coal to 
natural gas. No discussion on substitution from conventional oil to unconventional oil is included in 
the JRC report. The exclusion of such substitution is also done within the USGS, as reserve growth 
solves any near-future problems. The JRC report is clearly not of the pessimist branch even though 
it acknowledges the debate that taking a closer look at the availability of the resources is a good 
idea. The JRC therefore is somewhere in between the optimists and the pessimists as it takes on 
arguments from both sides, supported by the reserve growth theory, resulting in them being pretty 
optimistic about the URR. 
The JRC report itself does not emphasise much on their choice of data base, and that database’s 
epistemological viewpoints, which may suggest that considerations within this area have not been 
that big despite its impact on the POLES results. This possibility is further increased by the fact the 
USGS claim that their estimations can predict no further than 2025 the latest, which goes unad-
dressed in the JRC report. This is problematic as the JRC make scenarios for 2050, but as their data 
loses validity (according to the source) after 2025, any prediction after this point rests on dubious 
grounds. The JRC report however updates their information from the USGS as more data becomes 
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available, but as it is, it appears right now, the last 25 years of the in the JRC scenarios seem to lose 
much validity. 
6.6.1 Limitations of the Resource Section 
When considering the assumptions and approaches, it was decided that the focus would rest on the 
POLES resource supply module. The scope could alternatively have been on the JRC report’s han-
dling of national infrastructure changes as the carbon emission reduction takes place. Whether a 
transition to carbon emission reduction as presented in the scenario truly can take place in the time 
frames they set, would be to look at in such a situation. However it was decided that a discussion on 
the resource foundation made sense to have prior to an investigation of national infrastructure. The 
lack of focus in that field did therefore not affect the results in the resource module, but the overall 
understanding of resources as treated in the JRC report. 
A deeper consideration of whether it is reasonable to pool together oil and gas was excluded, which 
leaves a gaping hole concerning the more exact situation of gas availability. An analysis on the 
combination would have allowed for a more refined analysis on how resources are viewed sepa-
rately and bring further depth to the resource module.  
6.6.2 The Exclusion of Coal 
According to the JRC report, coal can be viewed as demand driven given the large recovery reserve 
estimated. This is due to the time frame of the JRC report and is therefore not as big a part as oil 
and gas that will run out in the near future (IPTS-POLES Manual, 2010, 24). The current research 
took this claim into consideration, but found that there were altogether problems with the estima-
tions on global coal reserves. Predictions on when coal production will peak range widely. From 
Hubbert’s calculation from 1976 the peak is estimated to be between 2100 and 2200. Laherrère’s 
calculation from 2004 estimates the peak to be in 2050 and last the Energy Watch Group’s (EWG) 
calculation from 2007 estimates the peak to be in 2025 (Mohr et al., 2009, 1). These estimations 
show that calculations differ vastly, and that there is no commonly agreed method for calculating 
the total coal reserves. The main step to estimating the most precise prediction will be lead by a 
better way of calculating the URR on a global scale (Ibid., 8). Due to the lack of reliable available 
data on coal reserves, the small time frame that this paper had, and the relevance that oil seemed to 
have over coal for the report, analysis of coal was excluded from this chapter.  
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7 Carbon Value 
The following chapter will treat the concept of carbon value. The first section will present the 
assumptions concerning the carbon value in the JRC report. In the next section it is investigated 
what price would lead to the most efficient abatement and what features a carbon market should 
have to provide this price. Based on these considerations, a more thorough investigation of the 
assumptions in the JRC report will follow. The two main focuses are the sectors and the role of the 
CDM in the carbon market. The last part of the chapter sums up the finding and evaluates the 
assumptions made in the JRC report in regards to carbon market. At the end a limitation section is 
added to showing the limitations in regards to this analysis. 
7.1 Assumptions about Carbon Value in the JRC Report 
The central incentive for GHG emission reductions in the scenarios of the JRC report is a carbon 
value. It is expected to trigger a number of developments that will enable the emission reductions 
(Russ et al., 2007, 52-62). 
In a perfect market, different mechanisms would lead to a common price signal across different 
countries and sectors (Stern, 2006, 309). As the scenarios in the JRC report use emission trading, 
this paper will be focusing on this mechanism.  
As mentioned above, the introduction of a carbon value serves as the central incentive for GHG 
emission reductions in the JRC report. Amongst other effects, the carbon value is expected to 
increase the application of energy efficiency measures across all sectors, an overall reduction of 
energy consumption and a drastic drop in the carbon intensity for the remaining energy. Especially 
renewable energy sources that are considered carbon-neutral gain a competitive advantage 
compared to fossil energy sources and will increase their market share with an increasing carbon 
value. Technologies such as carbon capture and storage (CCS) will become more important (Russ et 
al., 2007, 52-62). 
7.1.1 Cap-and-Trade Scheme 
The carbon prices used in the JRC scenarios are created through a carbon market that rests on a 
number of assumptions. It is vital to understand these assumptions in order to comment on the 
carbon market used in the JRC report, and as a consequence also on the carbon value that is used in 
the report. 
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The carbon price in the JRC report is created through emission trading. To make the predictions 
more realistic, the carbon market in the JRC report is not expected to operate with perfect foresight 
and perfect emission trading. In the short term this leads to an imperfect carbon-market across 
sectors and countries and results in different abatement and therefore different carbon costs (Ibid., 
36). 
Initially only energy intensive sectors are included, other industrial sectors are assumed to follow 
later.  Road transport and the residential and the tertiary sector are not included (Ibid., 35). 
7.1.2 CDM 
Countries that have an emission reduction target are assumed to reach their target primarily through 
domestic reduction. However, a substantial part of their reductions is expected to be achieved 
through flexible mechanisms such as the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), which 
contributes to around one quarter of the necessary reductions in the period of 2013-2030 (Ibid., 43). 
7.1.3 Optimal Carbon Prices 
In a first step, to gain an understanding of carbon prices and to be able to discuss the carbon value 
used in the JRC report that is expected to be the central incentive for GHG emission reductions, it is 
necessary to investigate which features a carbon price should have to lead to the most efficient 
emission reductions.  
7.1.4 The Social Cost of Carbon 
The Stern
26
 report stresses that one of the requirements for effective climate change mitigation 
demands that GHG emissions are reduced until the marginal cost of abatement is equal to the social 
cost of carbon (SCC) (Stern, 2006, 469). The concept of social cost of carbon “represents the 
economic cost caused by an additional ton of carbon-dioxide emissions or its equivalent” 
(Nordhaus, 2011, 2). 
It is important to note though that the SCC depends on the overall strategy for mitigating climate 
change. The lower the ultimate stabilisation goal, the lower the SCC, as future CO2 concentration is 
expected to be lower, and each emitted ton of carbon has a larger climate change impact if the CO2 
concentrations are higher. The SCC can therefore not be the driver of a strategy, but help in 
evaluating abatement strategies. If the stabilisation goal was chosen sensibly, the SCC should be a 
good indicator of the carbon price that is required to be an incentive for investment in development 
                                                 
26
 Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change, Nicholas Stern, October 2006 
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and implementation of less GHG-intensive technology and persuade consumers to buy less GHG-
intensive services and goods (Stern, 2006, 301). 
Although it would be desirable to choose the basic features of a tradable-quota scheme with the aim 
to generate a market price that reflects the SCC, there are a number of challenges that make exact 
estimations of the SCC difficult. 
On the one hand there are basic uncertainties concerning geophysical and economic factors, for 
example about the climate system, population growth or the future economic development 
(Nordhaus, 2011, 17). But there are also major uncertainties concerning the methodological 
approach, such as questions about the discount rate
27
, equity weighting
28
 or the consideration of 
differential technological change (Ibid., 17, 21, 25). 
Furthermore even if it was possible to exactly establish the SCC, in reality the market price for 
carbon may be different, as the actual market price is a cause of the “quota-driven demand for 
carbon reductions and the marginal cost of delivering reductions in the most cost-effective 
location” (Stern, 2006, 316). 
7.1.5 Influence of Cap-and-Trade Scheme features on the Carbon Price  
By investigating the factors that are responsible for the development of the carbon price in an 
emission trading scheme, it might be possible to understand what circumstances provide an efficient 
carbon price. 
The carbon price in cap-and-trade schemes will vary over time, but an effective policy framework 
that guarantees a certain level of price stability and a predictable average price are important for 
businesses to plan their long term investments (Ibid., 330). To achieve an effective policy 
framework, it is important that the scheme is credible (actors belief in durability and enforcement of 
scheme), flexible (possibility of policy change policy in response to new information and 
                                                 
27
Discounting is used by economists to compare economic impacts occurring at different times. The commonly 
proposed reasons why future consumption should have a lower value than present consumption are that people 
generally prefer the present to the future (inherent discounting), higher consumption levels in the future will lead to a 
lower marginal utility of additional consumption, the uncertainty of future consumption levels and the easier 
possibilities to address global warming concerns in the future through improved technology. 
The use of a high discount rate leads to a decrease in the assessed benefit of greenhouse gas reductions. (Source: Wik-
ipedia: Stern review: Discount rate ) 
28
Equity weighting is concerned with the different levels of consumption across space and time. For example the 
negative effects of climate change to poor people should be more heavily weighted than those to rich people (Nordhaus, 
2011, 10).As future generations are expected to be richer than today’s, equity weighting will generally reduce the Social 
cost of carbon. Investments might be valuable, but benefitting the rich (Nordhaus, 2011, 17). 
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circumstances) and predictable (circumstances that will lead to a policy change are clear) (Ibid., 
325).  
In practice the most relevant scheme to look at is the European Union’s Emission Trading System 
(EU ETS) that covers 6 different GHG, in 27 countries and is by far the largest emission trading 
schemes worldwide (Wråke et al., 2012, 12). 
Comparing the differences between the forecasted and the observed equilibrium price, Olsen et al., 
2012 looked at potential carbon market inefficiencies in the EU ETS. They concluded that the 
carbon price was overvalued at the beginning of 2008, but since the end of 2009 it is undervalued 
(Creti et al., 2012, 334). 
 It is not a problem if the carbon price is lower than expected, if the cap-and-trade scheme works 
optimal and reaches the required emission reductions (Wråke et al., 2012, 16). However the system 
used by the EU ETS to decide the quantity of emission cap was complex and sometimes 
controversial and lead to criticism that the number of allowances distributed was too high (Ibid., 
13). The appropriate scarcity of allowances is important for an effective carbon price and the 
allocation levels must be consistent with reduction targets and clearly below business-as-usual 
emissions. Other factors that influence scarcity are for example economic and technological 
development or the permission for companies to use credits or emission reductions in areas without 
a cap (credits from CDM projects) (Stern, 2006, 331 - 332).  
7.1.6 Globally Equal Carbon Price 
The price should be equal across all sectors and regions. The costs of abatement vary in some 
regions or sectors but without a broadly similar carbon price in all sectors and regions, possibilities 
to reduce emissions more cheaply will remain unexploited (Stern, 2006, 470). 
7.1.7 Scope of the Scheme 
A central factor that leads to a more efficient carbon price would be the inclusion of more sectors 
and gases and also flexible mechanisms such as the CDM. Sectors and regions vary widely in terms 
of availability and cost of abatement options. Emissions will initially decrease more in places with 
cheap abatement options, in sectors with expensive abatement options the price increase for the 
output will be greater (Ibid., 337). This provides a greater degree of flexibility for emission 
reductions that leads to lower abatement costs (Ibid., 331).  
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Another benefit of a broader market is an increase in stability. The deeper the scheme the smaller 
the ability of any individual trade and the impact of a shock in one sector to influence the whole 
scheme (Ibid., 331).  
The assumptions that have been used in the JRC report about the structure of the carbon market 
vary in part to these assumptions about a structure that would generate a carbon price that would 
lead to the most efficient emission reductions. This paper will investigate how far the structure in 
the JRC report differs from this structure. In a next step it will be investigated if the assumptions in 
the JRC report can be considered as being more realistic, as the main objective of the JRC report is 
not to create scenarios with the optimal, but the most realistic carbon market. 
7.2 Sectors 
7.2.1 Industrial Sectors 
In the JRC report emission trading is assumed to initially only take place in energy intensive sectors 
(including the power sector) of developed countries, followed by other industrial sectors (Russ et 
al., 2007, 36). 
The report states that due to the availability of low carbon energy sources and the importance of the 
fuel costs in the final production costs the power generation is described as the sector reacting most 
sensitively to the introduction of a carbon value. The reductions of GHG emissions in the power 
sector are therefore expected to provide 66 per cent of the total global emission reductions 
compared to the baseline scenario by 2030, decreasing to 55 per cent by 2050 (Ibid., 56).  
The heavy industry (such as iron, steel, cement, aluminium, paper industries, chemicals and 
petrochemicals) is another large emitter that is sensitive to carbon pricing, as a consequence of the 
high carbon intensity. These industries are well suited for emission trading, as sources of emissions 
are concentrated amongst relatively few installations, emissions can be effectively measured and 
monitored. These sectors have also been included in the Phase
29
 I and II of the EU ETS and other 
smaller trading schemes (Stern, 2006, 338). 
A carbon value for these sectors should be globally equal. Otherwise these industries would 
experience risks of competitiveness that could lead to carbon leakage
30
 (Ibid., 339). 
                                                 
29 Phase I: 2005-2007, Phase II: 2008-2012, Phase III: 2013-2020. 
30
Relocation of companies to regions that do not impose a carbon value, leading to emission reduction in a one country 
with a strict climate policy but an increase in CO2 emissions in a second country with weaker regulation. 
Group 16  SIB 21.2 Spring 2012 
 
Page 46 of 73 
 
In developing countries the industrial sector is also assumed by the JRC report to experience a 
carbon value by 2012, not through a binding emission reduction target and an emission trading 
scheme, but through policies such as CDM. 
7.2.2 Non-tradable Sectors 
In the non-trading sectors (transport, the residential and service sectors) no emission trading is 
assumed to take place (Russ et al., 2007, 36). As established earlier, a bigger number of included 
sectors would lead to a more stable and efficient carbon price. Therefore it is interesting to 
investigate whether the decision to exclude other sectors leads to more realistic assumptions, or is 
an unnecessary reduction of the potential of emission trading to provide efficient abatement 
possibilities. 
7.2.3 Aviation  
Aviation is not assumed to be included in an international trading scheme in the JRC report, despite 
its big impact on climate change. 
Aviation releases different gases and the effects these gases are bigger at high altitudes, leading to a 
bigger impact than the impact of the CO2 emissions alone (1.6 per cent of global GHG emissions). 
Therefore aviation could account for around five per cent of the total global warming effect (Stern, 
2006, 342).  
The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), a specialised agency of the United Nations, 
studied possibilities to regulate international aviation emissions and proposed emission trading, 
combined with the possibility to buy credits from non-aviation sources, such as the CDM (Haites, 
2011, 418). 
Furthermore in October 2007, a workshop on international aviation and maritime transport came to 
the conclusion that the monitoring and reporting of emissions would be possible. Reasons for the 
absence of global policies are therefore of political, not of technical nature (Ibid., 422). 
Other difficulties regarding the integration of aviation into emission trading schemes are the limited 
potential for emission cuts and the danger of carbon leakage problems that would result from a 
scheme that only operates regionally, as aircrafts would have an incentive to fuel up in countries 
outside the emission trading scheme (Stern, 2006, 341). 
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Despite these problems the EU decided to include international aviation emissions associated with 
flights to and from the member states into the EU ETS scheme from 2012 onwards (Haites, 2011, 
416). 
The inclusion of the aviation sector could lead to problems with carbon leakage, if it is not done on 
a global scale. But political agreement on the inclusion of aviation into a global cap-and-trade 
scheme will probably be possible, therefore also making the inclusion of the aviation sector into a 
global emission trading scheme, such as the scheme used in the JRC report, should be possible. The 
compatibility of this sector with such a scheme is highlighted by the decision of the European 
Union to include it in the EU ETS. It would not be assumed to trigger drastic emission reductions or 
provide cheap abatement possibilities, as “abatement costs are expected to be high relative to those 
in other sectors” (Haites, 2011, 423), but it would put a price on this sector that could reflect the 
contribution of emissions from aviation to climate change. 
7.2.4 Road Transport  
Road transport is one of the largest and fastest growing sources of CO2 emissions (Wadud et al., 
2008, 533). In the short term, the introduction of a carbon value in this sector would mostly 
improve the efficiency of this sector. Breakthrough technologies such as hydrogen are not available 
yet (Stern, 2006, 340). 
There are three different ways of implementing road transport into a trading scheme that allocate 
permits in a different way. 
Refineries located in the region within the scheme could be required to buy permits to cover the 
emissions that will result from the use of the fuel they produce in vehicles. 
The second approach would provide vehicle manufacturers with an efficiency target to fulfil for the 
vehicles they sell and require them to buy permits to the extent that they exceed this target, to cover 
expected lifetime excess carbon emissions resulting from the less fuel efficient vehicles. However, 
as future emissions from these vehicles are uncertain, this approach would be difficult to reconcile 
with trading schemes based on actual emissions. 
The third approach would distribute allowances to individual motorists, who would be required to 
surrender permits when they purchase fuel. A drawback from this approach is the high associated 
transaction costs. However, the last approach also has several benefits. A quantity instrument might 
lead to bigger emission reductions than prices (Ibid., 341). Furthermore, it would give consumers a 
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clearer incentive to reduce their emissions, and provide them with more choices to adjust their 
behaviour than permit trading among fuel suppliers (Wadud, 2011, 1063-1064). 
There are some possible risks associated with the inclusion of road transport into a cap-and-trade 
scheme. Most of the emissions from this sector are produced by a high number of individual 
vehicles (Stern, 2006, 340) the inclusion of this sector would probably raise the price of fuel and 
therefore have important distributional implications that must be considered (Wadud et al., 2008, 
533). Another possible risk is that consumers might face increased oil price fluctuation as “permit 
prices and oil prices might move in tandem” (Stern, 2006, 340). 
But there are number of benefits in including the road transport sector in an emission trading 
scheme. The emission cap approach ensures that the reduction target is being met, regardless of 
other factors as growth in income, population or vehicles (Wadud, 2007, 31). Another positive 
impact of a carbon value in this sector could be the prevention of a rebound effect, a behavioural 
response to cost reduction of an energy service. As vehicles get more efficient, the variable costs of 
using them decrease and consumers have more income available. This could be expected to lead to 
an increased use of the vehicles, partly offsetting the effect of the efficiency improvements.  
Lastly, a higher carbon price is also expected to stimulate innovation and energy efficiency 
innovation (Zachmann et al., 2012, 79). 
Although there are some risks, such as distributional implications, that have to be considered, the 
inclusion of road transport has a number of positive aspects. Apart from the positive effect on the 
emission trading scheme itself, improving efficiency and stability, it could also positively influence 
emission reduction and efficiency improvements. As there are a number of different possibilities 
how the transport sector could be integrated into an emission trading scheme, it is not unlikely that 
road transport will in the future be integrated into an emission trading scheme, and the decision of 
the JRC report to assume that the road transport sector will not be part of an emission trading 
scheme seems pessimistic. 
7.2.5 Residential Sector 
From a political point of view, it is problematic to “deliver a carbon price to sectors where it 
redistributes rents with significant equity implications” (Neuhoff, 2011, 90). 
This makes the inclusion of sectors like domestic heating in a cap-and-trade scheme difficult, 
especially in countries with high energy use for domestic heating.  
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If prices are expected to increase gradually, the inclusion of the residential sector would get even 
more difficult in the future, as there would be an abrupt change from no carbon price to a high 
carbon price. 
A free allocation allowances
31
 to domestic users or a compensation of households through revenues 
from allowance auctions, might be possibilities for reducing the economic impact on households, 
without excluding the whole sector (Ibid., 90). However, there are also other possibilities to reduce 
emissions through the use of non-market mechanisms, such as energy efficiency programs (Stanton 
et al., 2010, 1). 
Another factor that reduces the necessity of emission trading in this sector is that consumers will 
probably face prices through emission trading anyway, as energy companies required to purchase 
emission permits are likely to pass these cost on to the consumers (Ibid., 23). 
Because of the economic impacts on household it might be politically difficult to include the 
residential sector into an emission-trading scheme. Furthermore, non-market mechanisms can be 
effective and production costs from energy companies covered by a cap-and-trade scheme are likely 
to be passed on to consumers. As there are uncertainties surrounding the inclusion of the residential 
sector in an emission trading-scheme, the decision to exclude it in the JRC report seems 
understandable and more realistic. 
7.2.6 Agriculture and Land Use 
The emissions from the agricultural sector are divided amongst a large number of small farms, of 
which more than three quarters are in developing and transition economies. The level of emissions 
varies, as it depends on the specific farming practices and the local environmental conditions (Stern, 
2006, 342).  
The Australian government initially planned to include agriculture in a regional emission trading 
scheme (Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme (CPRS)), as it assumed that this market could provide 
a possibility of low cost emission reduction and the exclusion of this sector would increase the 
burden on the included sectors (Saddler et al., 2008, v). Ultimately, these plans were not realised 
(Australian Government – Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme, 2012). Saddler et al. (2008) argue 
that the structure of this sector makes it impossible to measure emissions accurately and cost 
effectively enough to include it in an emission trading scheme.  A scheme that includes agricultural 
                                                 
31
 Allowances can be auctioned or distributed for free. In this case it would mean that households get an amount of free 
allocations that they can use to cover their emissions. 
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emissions would therefore “lack the certainty necessary for market credibility and would fail to 
send the right price signal” (Saddler et al., 2008, v). It can be assumed that agriculture is not suited 
for emission trading and will continue to be excluded from emission trading schemes in the future. 
Therefore, the decision not to include this sector in the emission trading scheme in the JRC report is 
realistic. 
7.2.7 Overview of Sectors 
To sum up, it would be technically possible and it would provide several benefits to include more 
sectors into a global emission trading scheme than those that are assumed to be included in the JRC 
report. For example aviation, that is not assumed to be subject to emission trading, is in reality 
already part of the biggest existing trading scheme (EU ETS). Road transport is another very 
important sector that is likely to be included in a global emission trading scheme in the future. Other 
sectors, such as the residential or agricultural sector are difficult to include, therefore the decision to 
exclude them in the JRC report seems reasonable. 
It can be concluded that it is probable that more sectors will be included in future, contrary to the 
assumption in the JRC report that only includes the industrial. 
The inclusion of further sectors would have several benefits for the stability and effectiveness of the 
scheme, but also a positive effect on emission reductions and efficiency improvements in these 
sectors. The JRC report justifies the decision to include only the industrial sector, and therefore 
exclude the benefits that a broader scheme and the inclusion of the aviation and road transport 
would have, as being more realistic. As it seems more probable that these sectors will be included in 
an emission trading scheme in the long term, it would have been more reasonable to include more 
sectors. 
7.3 Globally Equal Price 
As mentioned before an equalised global carbon price is an essential measure to improve the 
efficiency of international collective action to deliver GHG reductions at the lowest possible cost. 
The lack of an equalised carbon price would lead to unexploited abatement opportunities and 
increase overall abatement costs (Stern, 2006, 479).  
The JRC report does not assume a globally equal carbon price for the near future. The approach to 
assume a carbon market with a globally equal carbon price is described as helpful to understand the 
theoretically ideal pathway to reach a required target, but unrealistic as it does not represent real 
world imperfections and behavioural patterns (Russ et al., 2007, 36). Only 37 industrialised 
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countries and the European community
32
, referred to as Annex I countries, have so far agreed to 
limit their emissions (United Nations – Kyoto Protocol, 2012) and only a small part of global 
emissions are currently covered by emissions trading schemes, the largest scheme is the EU ETS 
scheme (Stern, 2006, 479). Therefore the assumption that in the short term a global price, while still 
being desirable, is not realistic, is comprehensible. 
An equal carbon price is expected to be reached by 2030 for all countries except low income 
developing countries, therefore guaranteeing the desired big, deep and liquid market and the most 
efficient emission reduction (Russ et al., 2007, 38). 
The year 2030 would be well into the timeframe given by Nordhaus (2011) who estimates that 2050 
nearly complete global participation is required in order to achieve a limitation of temperature 
increase to two degrees Celsius. Without complete participation the costs to reach the target are 
supposed to be seven times higher (Nordhaus1, 2011, 12).  
In the JRC report developing countries are expected to first receive a carbon price in industrial 
sectors by being hosts to projects such as CDM. According to the JRC report, in the beginning this 
price will be low compared to developed countries because the CDM is confronted with obstacles 
such as regulatory and price uncertainties, imperfectly distributed information and limited 
awareness. The regulatory frameworks are expected to improve and an increase in awareness and 
information will lead to a decrease in the price differences between developed and developing 
countries and in the long term to a full integration of both sets of countries in a global carbon 
market (Russ et al., 2007, 37).  
The development pattern that will lead to a full integration of developed countries into the carbon 
market is therefore, at least in the beginning, very much dependent on the efficiency of mechanisms 
such as the CDM. However, there are doubts about how effectively this mechanism has proved to 
reach its targets. If the CDM would in practice not work as well as assumed by the JRC report, this 
would probably also have a negative influence on the development of developing countries towards 
a full integration in the global carbon market and a resulting globally equal carbon price.  
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 The European Community contained 15 states at the time of the negotiations for the Kyoto protocol 
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7.4 The Clean Development Mechanism 
The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) has a very important role in the JRC scenarios, it is 
assumed to provide about one quarter of the necessary emission reductions (Russ et al., 2007, 43). 
By investigating the efficiency of the CDM, we can examine whether this assumption is realistic.  
7.4.1 The Purpose of CDM 
The CDM is a market based trading instrument, operating within the global carbon market 
established under the Kyoto Protocol (Lecocq et al., 2006, 135). It has two overall objectives. First 
of all to provide an additional mechanism for developed countries (with a GHG reduction target) 
that will enable these countries to reach their GHG reduction target. Secondly, to help developing 
countries (without a target) achieve sustainable development (Grubb, 2003, 153-154). This is 
realised by allowing developed countries to invest in emission reduction projects, e.g. industrial 
gases, energy efficiency or renewable energy sources in developing countries. In return, the 
developed countries receive certificated emission reduction (CER) credits, where one credit is 
equivalent to one ton of CO2. The CER credits can thereby be subtracted from the emission 
reduction targets in the developed countries. To secure that CER credits are not given to projects 
that would have happened anyway, a key requirement of the CDM is to prepare a project design 
document (PDD) to prove that the emission reductions will be real, measurable and additional
33
 
(Stern, part VI, 2006, 14). The aim is that the projects will provide the developing countries benefits 
that will improve sustainable development such as technology transfers, improved health conditions 
and environmental assistance. Furthermore it aims to encourage developing countries to emit less 
GHG (Newell, 2012, 41: Wara, 2006). 
The incentive for developed countries to participate in the CDM is that the implementation of 
efficient reduction projects in developing countries is significantly cheaper than in developed 
countries due to the fact that it is cheaper to implement new low carbon emission energy capacity 
than invest in an already existing high energy efficient industry (Wara, 2006). The CDM is defined 
as a market mechanism, meaning that the price of CER is negotiated through the two parties 
representing developed and developing countries (Olsen, 2007, 61). This means that a carbon value 
is created for the energy intensive sector in developing countries even before they have a binding 
target attached (Russ et al., 2007, 35). 
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 Additional: reductions that are additional to any that would occur in the absence of the certified project activity 
(Grubb, 2007, 153). 
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7.4.2 Assumptions about CDM in the JRC Report 
The JRC report expects the CDM to play an important role for the developed countries to reach 
their GHG emission target. According to the report the developed countries will by 2030 reduce 
their emissions by 32 per cent whereas the goal is 50 per cent for that year. This means that they 
need an additional 18 per cent emission reduction to reach the target, which makes the tradable 
CER credits under the CDM essential for developed countries. As stated earlier, in the period 2013-
2030 one quarter of the total GHG reduction is expected to be traded between developed and 
developing countries through the CDM (Russ et al., 2007, 43). 
According to the JRC report, the CDM has since its beginning (2004) faced some difficulties, such 
as estimation of regulatory and price uncertainties (Russ et al., 2007, 42). Perfect distribution of 
information and the capacity of management have lacked behind as well. The accumulation of these 
issues has led to the introduction of a risk premium, which may have contributed to limitation of the 
reduction potentials (Newell, 2012, 42: Russ et al., 2007, 37). The JRC report was well aware of 
these issues while formulating the assumptions in regards to the role of the CDM. The JRC report 
assumes that the difficulties mentioned above will provoke a large gap between the carbon price in 
developed and developing countries from the year 2012 and onwards. Eventually the gap will 
decrease and lead to an equal carbon price, meaning that developing countries will be fully 
integrated in the global carbon market (Russ et al., 2007, 37-38). 
7.4.3 Other Issues in regards to CDM 
The JRC report has taken some limitations into consideration to be able to make more realistic 
assumptions for the scenarios, however additional issues have arisen which are not included in the 
JRC report. To be able to comment on whether the JRC report should have considered these issues 
when formulating the role of the CDM, it is important to look into the different points of critique. It 
is important to notice that the following issues were discussed in public forums, also before 2007, 
the year the JRC report was released (Hepburn, 2007: Wara, 2006). 
One of the issues is concerned with the distributional manner of the CDM projects. It has been 
proved that most of the projects are established in fast developing countries dominated by China, 
India and Mexico with only very few projects being implemented in the poorest countries 
(Winkelman et al, 2010, 1132). On one hand it is argued that the fast developing countries emit the 
highest amount of GHG and thus it is important to engage the CDM projects in these countries 
before concentrating on the less GHG intensive countries (Ibid., 1132). On the other hand, the 
objective of the CDM is to provide sustainable development benefits to developing countries. This 
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means that differential distribution of the CDM will lead to a great allocation of the sustainable 
development benefits to the fast developing countries and put the less-developing countries even 
more behind (Ibid., 1132). 
The efficiency of the objective that emphasises that the CDM should support sustainable 
development in developing countries has been scarce. Introduction of new technologies and 
efficient policies in regards to carbon captures, sequestration and energy efficiency has been limited 
(Hepburn, 2007, 385). Additionally it is criticised that there has been too little focus on long-term 
CO2 projects and that the CDM has not affected the current demand for high carbon production. For 
instance, the CDM has been accused for doing too little to affect the increase of coal-power plants 
in China (Ibid., 385). 
The major incentive for developed countries to invest in emission reduction projects in developing 
countries was due to the low cost compared to similar projects in the developed countries. Even 
though the projects under the CDM may be cheaper to implement in the developing world, the price 
level paid for by the developed countries for some projects (especially non-CO2 projects) has often 
been around 10 times greater than the real cost of most of the reductions. This is because the price 
level is regulated by the balance of supply and demand in the EU ETS (Ibid., 386).  If companies 
have to pay a significantly larger price for the emission reductions through the CDM than they are 
worth, a part of the advantage of this mechanism to offer possibilities of cheaper reduction is lost. 
To be approved as a project under the CDM and thereby be awarded with CER credits, the project 
has to be real, measurable and additional. In more details, the term real means that the emission 
reduction should be sufficiently monitored to insure that a reduction actually takes place (Wara, 
2006). It should be measurable which implies that the effect and results of the project can be 
measured. It is done through a hypothetical baseline of the emissions that illustrates the emissions 
that would occur without the CDM (Ibid.). This is correlated to the last requirement that emphasises 
that the project should be additional meaning that the project would not happen in the absence of 
the CDM. 
The high level of uncertainty when making a hypothetical baseline, questions whether the emission 
reductions transferred to the developed countries is estimated correct. It has even been argued that 
the emission reduction coming from the CDM may be minimal. Nordhaus argues that despite the 
great transfer of CER credits there is no method to verify whether reduction actually takes place in 
the developing countries (Nordhaus1, 2011, 12). 
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Furthermore, the industries participating in the CDM in developing countries are already relatively 
highly regulated, meaning that further domestic reduction would be of high cost, the CDM subsidy 
creates incentives for policy makers in the developing countries not to implement more 
environmental regulations (Wara, 2006:Neuhoff, 2011, 15). Instead of implementing new 
regulations to abate emissions that will be costly, it is economically preferable for the developing 
countries to abate emissions through projects that are financed through a foreign subsidy under the 
CDM. In connection to that, it is argued that local regulators have an incentive to purposely make 
the required baseline for CDM-potential projects higher, to increase the chances of CDM subsidy 
(Wara, 2006). 
Additional critique towards the requirement is that the transaction costs concerned with registration 
are too high and that it is too difficult to prove that the project is additional. It is difficult for smaller 
projects to overcome the associated costs and thereby be approved, especially within the area of 
renewable energy and energy efficiency (Hepburn, 2007, 386). To prove that a project is 
‘additional’ is difficult in practice. Though it sounds like a straightforward concept, it involves 
speculation about what would happen if the project was not financed which can be hard to 
determine (Ibid., 386). On one hand there is a strong need for the requirements to prevent people to 
manipulate the system in order to deceive that they are eligible to receive CER credits. On the other 
hand it may prevent smaller projects to be approved because of the too high transaction costs (Stern, 
part VI, 2006, 16). However the critique mentioned above strongly questions the efficiency of the 
CDM, whether the CDM may lead to bad incentives and if the emission reductions actually take 
place. 
7.4.4 HFC-23 and CDM 
One of the most debated critiques of the CDM is the exchange of emission reductions of various 
non-CO2 gases in the developing countries to CO2 reduction emissions in developed countries, used 
to reach the target of the Kyoto Protocol (Wara, 2006). The CDM operates with six different gases; 
one of the most controversial is hydrofluorocarbons-23 (HFC-23). HFC-23 is a waste product 
created in the production of chlorodifluoromethane-22 (HCFC-22), which is a cooling instrument in 
refrigerators and air-conditions (Ibid.). In 2007 non-CO2 gases account for around 70 per cent of the 
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total emission reduction whereas 52 per cent of them are HFC-23 projects
34
 (Lecocq, 2007, 142-
143). 
HFC-23 has an extremely high global warming potential; one ton of HFC-23 gases emitted to the 
atmosphere has the same impact as 11.700 tonnes of CO2 emitted (Hepburn, 2007, 385), also 
meaning that HFC-23 is 11.700 times more worth than CO2 under the CDM. Furthermore the 
marginal abatement costs are very low, amounting to less than US$ 1/tCO2e and this leads to huge 
revenue from CER credits (Schneider, 2011, 852). 
Schneider, in the paper ‘Perverse Incentives under the CDM: an Evaluation of HFC-23 Destruction 
Projects’, from 2011, concludes that the high revenue awarded by the CDM could provide an 
incentive to produce a larger amount of HFC-23 than without CDM revenue. Schneider emphasises 
that it is most likely that the project management has been aware of the economic achievements for 
staying just above the CER limit (Ibid., 854). This indicates that the high profit achieved through 
the CDM results in a larger production of HFC-23 than would occur in the absence of the CDM. 
The problem of bad incentives in regards to the production of HFC-23 has been known since 2005, 
where it was discussed on the Montreal Climate Change Conference (Ibid., 852). However, not 
before 2011, the EU decided to ban CER credits coming from HFC-23 and N2O projects through 
the CDM post 2012 (Neuhoff, 2011, 148). This means that the issue with HFC-23 production was 
well known prior to the publication of the JRC report, yet the report did not take it into 
consideration.  
From 2008 to 2012 (phase II) the CER credits expected from the CDM projects may have been 
achieved, however if the high revenue from the CDM has led to a higher production of HFC-23 
than without the CDM, the overall emission reduction would be narrowed in a global perspective 
and this will most likely affect the outcome of the scenarios in the long-term.  
As stated above, from the beginning of 2013, it is no longer allowed for European countries to 
transfer CER credits coming from HFC-23 and N20 projects. This means that to uphold the same 
amount of emission reduction from the CDM, new type of projects will need to take a larger share 
e.g. renewable energy sources and energy efficiency. However due to HFC-23 projects big 
contribution to the total amount of emission reductions this might be challenging. In 2011 there 
were 23 CDM projects concerned with HFC-23 and N20. The 23 projects accounted for two thirds 
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 The last 18 per cent of non-CO2 gases were: Methane capture form landfill gas and coal mines (13 per cent) and N2O 
destruction (5 per cent). 
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of the total CER credits traded with developed countries (Europa – Emission trading, 2012). This 
means that the total emission reduction and thereby also CER credits available through the CDM 
may be reduced, until new projects are in place. It is argued that most other projects require five to 
seven years to get started, thus limit the amount of CER credits in that period (Lecocq, 2007, 142-
143).  
The decision was announced January 2011 but it will not become effective before the 30
th
 of April 
2013 (Europa – Emission trading, 2012). On one hand this will give the CDM Executive Board the 
possibility to tighten their policy and it will give the project management the ability to adapt to the 
new situation. On the other hand if it takes five to seven years before some projects are fully 
implemented, this may lead to a period with a reduced total emission reduction. 
Additionally, to equal the same emission reduction generated by the HFC-23, a lot more projects 
are needed. As stated above, only 23 HFC-23 projects are needed to generate two thirds of the total 
reduction whereas renewable energy projects, in 2006, accounted for 384 out of the 700 projects, 
but only provided 18 per cent of the total emission reductions (Wara, 2006). This indicates that a 
significant decrease of the amount of emission reduction from the CDM may occur from year 2012 
onwards. Because the decision was made in 2011, the JRC report did not have the chance to 
consider this policy; however it may still affect the results in reaching the goal of a maximum 
increase of two degrees by 2050. 
7.4.5 Overview of CDM 
To sum up, the CDM has been exposed to a lot of critique. It has been claimed to be an inefficient 
tool to provide sustainable development benefits to developing countries. Furthermore, too high 
transaction costs that might have limited the variation of projects are also an issue. The CDM is 
claimed to focus on projects concerned with non-CO2 gases rather than long-term CO2 projects. At 
last it is argued that the CDM leads to perverse incentives, which result in additional production of 
GHG, due to high CDM subsidies. The JRC report expects around one quarter of the total reduction 
emission to come from the CDM. Taken all the critique into account this paper considers that the 
efficiency of the CDM is lower than expected in the JRC report. The developed countries may still 
be able to get the CER credits needed to reach their target, especially in the second phase (2008-
2012), where CER credits from HFC-23 production is still allowed. However, due to bad incentives 
that follow the CDM, the global reduction might be lower than expected. Additionally, due to the 
fact that the emission reductions through CDM projects are estimated based on a hypothetical 
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baseline, the real emission reduction might be inaccurate, which means that in reality emission 
reductions can be lower than expected. 
The JRC report does not take the presented critique into consideration, thus this paper argues that 
the assumptions in regards to the CDM made by the JRC in the long run, may be too optimistic. 
7.5 The Role of Carbon Pricing in the JRC 
The lack of a carbon value can be seen as one of the reasons that lead to an over emission of GHG 
as the damages caused by these emissions are not economically reflected. 
In theory a carbon price should reflect the social cost of carbon to make sure that emissions are 
abated until the point where further emission reductions would not make sense from an economical 
point of view. Other important criteria for an effective carbon price that should lead to an ideal 
reduction path are the reliability, durability and flexibility of the carbon price. To achieve this 
optimal price, this paper established a number of criteria that the carbon market should fulfil.  
It should include as many sectors and countries as possible, the same price should apply for as many 
regions as possible and there should be offset mechanisms such as CDM to connect regions that are 
not yet included. 
In order to evaluate the carbon value that is used in the GHG reduction scenarios in the JRC report 
this paper looked at three key assumptions that are used to create the carbon market in the JRC 
report. 
Firstly, the JRC carbon market includes only the industrial sector. However, a future carbon market 
would probably include at least the aviation and road transport sector, as there are clear benefits of 
including them and it is technically possible. 
By including only one sector, the carbon market established in the JRC report would therefore not 
provide the most efficient emission reductions as in a multi-sectoral market. Based on these 
considerations this paper argues that the JRC report should have taken the transport sector into 
consideration to make a more realistic scenario. 
Secondly, the next assumption concerns the role of the CDM. This offset mechanism is expected to 
provide one quarter of the total emission reduction by the year 2030 and significantly reduce the 
overall abatement costs. 
But there are several issues with the efficiency of the CDM, especially regarding its tendency to 
create bad incentives that can lead to higher emissions of GHG than in the absence of the CDM. 
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Furthermore, because the estimated emission reductions generated through CDM are based on a 
hypothetical baseline the estimations are inaccurate and this makes it difficult to estimate the actual 
level of reduction.  
As these problems were not considered in the JRC report, the emission reductions achieved through 
the CDM might be less than assumed in the report, or come at higher costs. 
Finally, the JRC report assumes a globally equal carbon price for sectors participating in an 
emission trading scheme by 2030 for all countries but low income developing countries. However, 
the JRC report expects the CDM to have an important role in the development of an equal global 
carbon price. If features of the CDM, such as the technology transfer from developed to developing 
countries, proves to be less effective than assumed in the JRC report, this might also affect the 
development of a globally equal carbon market until 2030. 
Overall, this paper argues that the JRC report should have considered including the transportation 
sector and be more critical towards the efficiency of the CDM. 
7.5.1 Limitations of the Carbon Value Section 
It was decided to look at validity of the assumptions that are used to build a carbon market in the 
JRC report, rather than the actual carbon price generated by the GEM-E3 and POLES models. To 
comment on the actual price levels would be a very complex process and require us to have full 
access to all the data, assumptions and models used in the JRC report. The same problems make it 
also impossible for us to make qualified conclusions of the implications the critique will have on the 
target of reaching a limitation of the temperature increase of two degree Celsius. 
Furthermore, there are a lot of features of the carbon market, such as the scarcity of allowances or 
the linking between different regional schemes that are not described detailed enough to enable a 
discussion about them. 
Lastly, a lack of description of how global carbon market should develop made it difficult to 
investigate the assumption that in 2030 most countries will be part of a global carbon market. 
Therefore it is only possible to question the role that the CDM is assumed to have for this process, 
rather than the assumption itself. 
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8 Discussion 
8.1 The Underlying Assumptions and Approach 
The JRC report allowed this paper to discuss resources and carbon pricing, as seen in the previous 
chapter. In the resource section it was discovered that the JRC report’s approach to the resource 
questions was primarily based on data taken from the USGS 2000 survey. The USGS seemed to 
have a rather optimistic viewpoint on oil and oil reserves and this was reflected in both, the 
estimates of oil reserves, as well as how oil prices were calculated in the JRC report. Oil reserves 
growth was based on observations done in the U.S. and what data was gained from those 
observations was then applied to the rest of the world's reserves, in order to give an estimate of the 
total amount of recoverable reserves.  The oil price was calculated as a function of the reserves-to-
production ratio and both the recoverable reserves and reserves-to-production ratio show that the 
JRC report has an understanding of oil production that opposes the pessimists’ viewpoint. Both the 
estimations on oil reserves and oil price mechanisms reflect an idea that the market will come up 
with any necessary technology required to pump out oil from onshore deposits (or from offshore 
deposits). 
The JRC uses carbon pricing as a tool to reduce carbon emissions on a global scale. In the previous 
chapter two important conclusions could be drawn and these were concerning sectors and the CDM. 
It has been argued that the more sectors included, the better carbon pricing can be made. As it is 
right now, the JRC report only includes the industrial sector and therefore goes against the above 
mentioned argument; the more sectors included the more effective carbon pricing. It is argued that 
the transportation sector is one that would be possible to include, and so the exclusion of this sector 
seems to be invalid. There appears to be no given reason as to why the industrial sector was 
excluded aside that the JRC report decided against expecting a perfect carbon market. Regions that 
are not yet included, are expected to be connected through the CDM. It is expected within the JRC 
report that the CDM will experience short-term problems such as regulation and management 
problems, but it will not affect the long-term success of CDM. This however seems to ignore 
problems with the CDM such as its potential to create bad incentives that might go against its 
original intended use. The JRC report seems to be holding back when it comes to including sectors, 
but when it comes to the CDM, it can be regarded as rather optimistic, as the potential problems 
with CDM are ignored. 
Group 16  SIB 21.2 Spring 2012 
 
Page 61 of 73 
 
8.2 The Influence of the Underlying Assumptions and Approach on 
the Reliability of the Scenarios 
The JRC report follows an optimist approach to resources, but the report’s estimations of oil URR 
might lead to an overestimation of resource reserves. An overestimation will certainly lead to an 
underestimation of resource price increase through the next 40 years, as well as a more basic 
understanding of when oil scarcity becomes a more serious global problem. This in turn will affect 
the possibility for the report’s expected transition to the low carbon emission infrastructure to be 
possible in the manner expected in the report. Furthermore the idea that oil price can be estimated as 
a function of reserves-to-production ratio gives a picture of how resource extraction works, that 
goes directly against what pessimists would claim to be true. A reserves-to-production ratio relies 
on the idea that total reserves can be fully extracted  which would not take into consideration the 
Hubbert curve observation, that predicts that extraction of resources follows a bell-shaped curve, so 
that when half of the extractable resources have been extracted, the production will steadily decline. 
In the reserves-to-production ratio no decline in production is expected throughout the whole 
extraction process, and such might lead to a false picture of oil extraction as seen in reality. A good 
understanding and estimations of resources are invaluable for the JRC report, as everything in the 
globalised world is resource dependent, and because of that resources must be carefully examined, 
in order to give a valid prediction of the future.  
Within the carbon pricing expectations, one of the big means to achieve carbon emission reductions, 
the exclusion of the transportation sector does not add to make the scenario more unrealistic. From 
what was seen in the carbon pricing chapter, an exclusion of the transportation sector appears 
unnecessary and so a more realistic picture of how carbon emission reduction can be achieved 
through carbon pricing, would benefit from an inclusion of the transportation sector. Regarding the 
CDM the JRC report, as mentioned above, ignores some of the potential problems that CDM might 
bring. The long-term potential problems of CDM could be as far reaching as to actually create 
incentives that would work against the original intent, creating a big problem for the report, given 
that a quarter of the total emission reduction is expected to come from the CDM.  Furthermore some 
of the features of the CDM, such as technology transfer from developed to developing countries 
might happen at a slower pace than what is expected in the report.  
From an overall perspective the JRC report is fairly optimistic in the scenarios, with a perpetual 
held belief that technological development is to be expected. Although technological development 
is not at all an unrealistic thing to expect, this is also criticised within the resource part, as 
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technological development would never change the fact that resource reserves will not be fully 
extractable at any point. Given the more strange happenstances in the resource part such as the fact 
that the USGS claims that their predictions will be reliable no further than the year 2025 the latest. 
The resource reserve part appears to have been taken rather lightly, where the carbon pricing gives 
an idea that it has been put in focus, given the more careful consideration in that section. The JRC 
report is designed to create carbon reduction emission scenarios. A large focus on actual carbon 
emission techniques such as carbon pricing is understandable, though not fully justified, as one 
needs to have as clear an idea as possible of the interconnected mechanisms of the JRC report, from 
resources to carbon pricing, to create a decent and reliable picture of a plausible reduction scenario.   
The JRC report was created to bring further discussion to how carbon reduction scenarios should or 
could be created, and so this paper can be viewed as a direct response to that aim. This paper has 
shown potential problems that might occur within what were considered the most important aspects 
of the JRC report.  
8.3 Future Research 
The potential problems of the JRC report’s most important aspects should be further investigated. 
Further investigation should rely on a more technical approach, bringing discussion on data 
regarding carbon pricing and resources to a level where further critique can be given on whether, 
for instance, disregarding the Hubbert curve will create more unlikely scenarios than if it was taken 
into consideration. Including a discussion that also relied on a more technical approach, the 
discussion on the adaptability of infrastructure, would also prove relevant. The question was left 
unaddressed in this paper, though if time permitted it such question should be included, given the 
huge influence such a part holds on the overall reliability of the JRC report.  
8.4 Limitations 
Abstraction opened up ways for this paper to focus on what appeared to be the most relevant, given 
the problem formulation. Although the approach was useful, some things had to be left unaddressed 
primarily due to time pressure. When looking at resources an interesting aspect of the POLES 
model was its understanding of how receptive infrastructure is to the kind of change that the JRC 
report expects to happen. The lack of focus in that area did not affect what was focused on, however 
if included it would have allowed further understanding of whether the expectations of the JRC 
report can be relied upon.  
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A limitation of the carbon pricing chapter is the fact that actual carbon pricing level goes 
unaddressed. Focusing on such an issue would have been interesting given the JRC report’s actual 
estimate on what the carbon price will be.  In order to answer the question whether the price seemed 
reasonable or not would have demanded a technical debate and technical knowledge that exceeds 
the time frame of this paper. In general however limitations of the carbon pricing chapter were not 
as much due to time constraints as due to lack of available data on some of the actual carbon pricing 
mechanisms expected in the report. 
When investigating the main assumptions and underlying methodology of the JRC report a more 
general assumption about the quality of the report was made; it was assumed that its understanding 
of what carbon emissions are and what carbon emitters would be relevant to look at for the report 
was in order. The ontological field was accepted at face value, which seemed reasonable within 
limited scope of this study. Including the ontological field and its treatment within the report would 
have allowed for a more in-depth study. However, such inclusion relied upon that more time to do 
the project would be available is required as well as a more technical approach. 
Within the resource section of this paper, it was not possible given the data that this project used, to 
draw major conclusions on whether the optimist or pessimist approach was the more likely to be 
realistic. To draw such conclusions, while at the same time respecting the complexity of the issues, 
further education on the matter that goes beyond four months project work would be in demand. It 
would have been preferable to have a more technical debate than what was included in this paper as 
the influence of such debate would have been profound. Within critical realism, the underlying 
mechanisms of any real domain have a causal potential, and as stated in the methodology chapter, 
the better the understanding of the actual and empirical level, the better the understanding of the 
real domain. Leaving out a more technical discussion is a limitation but it is also treated as such 
within this paper. Any conclusion that is drawn in this paper was carefully weighed against the 
knowledge that was acquired, in order not to conclude things that this type of research disallowed.  
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9 Conclusion 
This paper investigated the assumptions and approach of the JRC report. The JRC report created 
three scenarios out of which one was a GHG emission reduction scenario. The three were made so 
that critique of the scenarios would be possible.  
In order to investigate the assumptions and approach of the JRC report, this paper decided to 
investigate the JRC report through critical realism. Critical realism served to create a way to 
approach the JRC report, moving from the report itself, to what could be considered to be its most 
important aspects.  
This paper settled on the concepts ’resources’ and ’carbon value’ as the most important aspects to 
look at. Resources is to be understood as the resource supply module in the POLES model and 
carbon value as a general incentive as presented in both the POLES- and the GEM-E3 model. Both 
carbon value and resources were investigated looking into the general assumptions and approach 
while considering critique of the latter. 
In the resource part it was concluded that the JRC report was rather optimistic, meaning that it 
assumed general market mechanisms to solve potential resource reserve problems. This was viewed 
as deeply problematic by ’pessimists’ who argued that the market mechanisms used in the JRC 
report would not apply to reality as there are geophysical limits technology cannot solve. 
In the carbon value part it was shown that the JRC report had solely included the industrial sector, 
but the analysis showed that it would be beneficial to include the transportation sector as well, as 
such inclusion did not contain any major complications. The CDM was in the JRC report expected 
to have some complications in the beginning, but long term problems remained untouched. This 
was regarded as problematic since the CDM appears to have potential long term problems that 
could prove to affect the reliability of the JRC report, since a quarter of the expected carbon 
emission reductions are anticipated to come through the CDM.  
 The JRC report appears in general to have a pretty optimistic approach and the critique presented in 
this report concerns the problems that this optimistic approach could have.  
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